Breaking the Army

Last December, former Secretary of State (and former Chairman, JCS), Colin Powell said the "active Army is about broken.”

Although I hesitate to differ with Powell, I think that is an overstatement. But I do think that the Army is in deep trouble. The Marines are in a similar situation. I wanted to start a series of posts on the nature of insurgencies and methods of counterinsurgency operations, but I need to put that on hold and discuss the condition of our ground troops.

I’ve already shown in previous posts that the current counterinsurgency operations and the troop surge will not work. Other recent news and some blog posts lead me to believe that our Army and Marines are in serious trouble, mostly because of the extent and duration of operations in Iraq.

There are two central factors working here. First, we have too few Army and Marine ground combat units to prosecute a large-scale insurgency-based war like Iraq. It didn’t have to be a large-scale insurgency-based war but the Bush Administration’s past mistakes allowed it to get that way and that’s the war we have. Second, the troops are running out of critical equipment and that equipment is not being replaced due to budget constraints in Washington, D.C.

The first factor of too few troops involves both numbers and time. We are now fighting one major and one minor war, and have other troops deployed in several regions of the world. The major war is Iraq and the minor war is Afghanistan, both are counterinsurgency operations and not conventional wars. Troops levels in both wars are achieved by pushing the deployment schedules far beyond the standard rotation rate that allows two years of stateside duty. The schedule now allows 12 months or less stateside. During that 12 months the Army and Marines are supposed to train, refit, be with family, and to just be outside the combat zone.

My experience in Vietnam showed that the time in the battle zone had more effect on morale and force retention than did the severity of combat. Soldiers can take a lot stress if they know there will be periodic relief or they know the war has a foreseeable end. Repeated deployments sap the mind, prevent effective training, and destroy families.

Twelve months “back home” is simply not enough time to accomplish all that is required. This is an extreme hardship on the active Army and Marines, but may be even harder on the National Guard and Reserves and their communities. These units comprise about 46% of the total Army and Marine forces (it is actually nearer 52% at this time). Their combat service involves hardships similar to that of the regular Army and Marines, but they also have civilian jobs. The drawdown on the communities causes staffing problems with firefighter and police units. Jobs which are supposed to remain open while the service member is deployed mysteriously disappear.

Most of our regular Army and Marine officers and enlisted members perform their jobs with dedication and skill. They seem to have everything they need except enough troops to do the job assigned. But the strains are showing. The following three paragraphs are excepted from a July 3^rd posting on Intel Dump:

“Gen. Richard Cody, the Army vice chief of staff, was the first to sound the alarm publicly late last year. He warned that soldiers need more than 12 months between deployments so that they can complete a full range of combat training.”

And earlier this year, Maj. Gen. Robert Williams, the commander of the Army Armor Center said, “I am concerned, …based on reports from the field as well as observations of training units, that the long war is taking a toll on our core competencies."

That post generated a lot of comments. One commenter, obviously someone with recent or current duty in Iraq, said, “These officers will be assuming Company/Troop/Battery command in the next 18-24 months and have not had the benefit of maneuvering their core assets at the platoon level, let alone as a company.” He also noted, “I've seen dozens of great NCOs (non-commissioned officers) that are retiring at 20 or 21 years. … I know many of these E-7s and E-8s would have stayed for 25 or 30 years. Now, they're out at 20. My old BDE (brigade), 2/10 MTN (2^nd Brigade, 10^th Mountain Division), has hemorrhaged NCO talent at the 20 year mark. I suspect the situation is similar elsewhere.” (Items in parentheses are my explanations.)

We also hear periodic news about the Army reducing its enlistment requirements to meet recruitment goals (which are apparently still not being met). No one should doubt that the effectiveness of our military hinges on skilled service members. We’ve developed a new kind of military force that can strike hard, precisely, and quickly, and with few casualties. This requires highly intelligent, highly trained, and dedicated members. There is no room for any but the very best of people.

Counterinsurgency operations are at least equally as complex as conventional war, but it is a whole new set of requirements laid on top of existing war fighting requirements. It is asking a lot to attempt to convert our troops to fight two kinds of war and, now, to ask them to train for both in the 12 months stateside. It is No one should expect the same level of performance when new inductees are of a lower caliber. This will be especially true for counterinsurgency operations which require more individual exposure to danger as well as a higher sensitivity to customs and mores in the host country.

Now look at the National Guard. Late in 2006 and before the surge, the President of the National Guard Association, General Koper, USAF (Ret.) said, "It goes without question that Guard brigade combat teams are going to have to deploy again to theater in less time than the . . . model originally called for.” (He was referring to the rotation goal of 2 years stateside versus the current 12 months.)

Also late in 2006, Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, commander of the Army National Guard said, "What we're working out of right now is a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our force to death… If we continue to piecemeal these things like Swiss cheese, we will not find ourselves able to build complete forces back." In that same testimony before a Senate committee, he also said of one unit commander, “"He doesn't have a problem of old equipment. He has a problem of no equipment."

The above quotes are from a November 5, 2006 Washington Post article.

Secretary Gates said in a Senate hearing that the $22 billion for the Army National Guard over the next five years, would take Guard units up to 76% of their authorized equipment levels. The 76% level is the normal equipment levels, but one must ask what their condition will be during that five years, assuming the money is actually funded.

The shortage was highlighted in May 2007 after the Kansas tornados which devastated a small town. The Pentagon admitted that the Guard has only 56% of needed equipment (some units had as low as 35%). Among the budget shortfalls were: 18,600 Humvees, 30,100 trucks, 159 Chinook helicopters.

"Right now, there's nothing in the budget to do this, there's no plan to resupply them, and this is creating a real concern among governors around the states," Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) said.

The Army and Marines are not yet broken, but both services are in severe trouble that will take years to correct. The Iraq War is at the heart of the problem and the longer we stay, the greater will be the damage to ground combat services. Meanwhile, we still face a War on Terror, many failed states, a shaky Pakistan, and a boiling Middle East, any one of which could require U.S. action.

I have been opposed to a rapid exit from Iraq, but I now see no other option. We can’t win on any meaningful terms with the inadequate troop levels we have. The Iraqi government has made no progress toward a legitimate government. To stay means only more deaths of troops and civilians, further strengthening of jihadist and religious/ethnic insurgencies, and increased anger at the U.S. throughout the area.

I also understand the impact that such a withdrawal would have on the military. I have spent much of my life, as a career military officer, believing that our country and our military does not give up. I still believe that, but in this case we’ve worked our way into an losing situation and we should withdraw and rebuild for the bigger war that just around the corner.