Counterinsurgency 102, Elements & Narrative

FM 3-24 describes five elements of any insurgency, making insurgencies far more complex than the media covers. The five elements are:

• Movement leaders
• Combatants
• Political cadre
• Auxiliaries
• Mass base

The media generally reports on only the first two. Combatants gain the most press since these insurgents plant IEDs, use AK-47’s and RPG’s, and commit atrocities against civilians. Press coverage of movements leaders often describes them as solely military leaders. Yet movement leaders are primarily strategic planners and idea people. (See Counterinsurgency 101 for more information on the complex strategic planning used by today’s insurgent movements.) Movement leaders are leaders because they are charismatic and they are effective in expressing movement goals in ways that address the perceived problems of the masses.

The political cadre provide guidance and procedures for the entire movement. If the insurgency is religiously based, the cadre will act as religious and spiritual advisors. The political cadre is in charge of propaganda and seeks to either use existing grievances against the government, or creates the perception of grievances. They will then explain how the insurgency plans to correct those grievances. A favored target is occupation forces.

We have rebuilt the Iraqi infrastructure and, in some cases, actually improved on such things as electricity and sanitation compared to pre-invasion conditions. However, the Iraqi people have higher expectations and we have not met those expectations. Thus they perceive problems that are both imagined and real. The effect is magnified by the main thing we have not provided – security.

Auxiliaries provide safe houses, store weapons and supplies, act as couriers and intelligence gatherers, and provide funding, among other necessary support functions.

The mass base is simply the population that supports the insurgency either through shared beliefs or through coercion. It is difficult for COIN forces to separately identify the mass base from the combatants and the auxiliaries.

I have no information on the relative percentages of each of these elements in the different insurgencies within Iraq. Since the Army and Marines have not expanded their language skills to what is required, I suspect they too have limited knowledge of the size of each element in the Iraqi insurgencies.

Ideas are the prime motivating agent in modern insurgencies. Communicating those ideas is the function of the leaders and political cadres. As noted above, the ideology of an insurgency: 1) explains the problems of the masses in terms the insurgency can solve, and 2) explains how the insurgency will correct those problems.

While most Muslims may have little desire to defeat the West, there is wide-spread anti-Western anger in most Islamic countries. It is then easy for a religiously-based insurgency to provide the masses with:

1. identity
2. purpose
3. community

The mechanism for communicating the idealogy is the Narrative. The narrative is simply a story, often played against history. The Middle East has a long and rich history and that history is familiar to everyone included even the most unschooled person. Their history begins with Mohammed. It is mostly a history of Islam and history outside of Islam is either not covered or is covered only in passing. The history is often false in terms of facts, but it is real to most all Muslims.

Osama bin Laden has a narrative. He was purified in the mountains of Afghanistan and he is now inspiring his followers and punishing the infidels. He and his followers are agents of Islamic history.

Bin Laden, in a video tape aired October 2001, referred to the “humiliation and disgrace” that Islam suffered for “more than eighty years.” (from The Crisis of Islam, Bernard Lewis, Random House, 2003). In the West, there was a scramble to find something of historical significance “more than eighty years” ago, while nearly all in the Middle East immediately recognized the reference. It was the defeat of the Ottoman sultanate by the British and French in 1918. Since the sultan was also recognized as the caliph of all Islam, this was a final and humiliating defeat in the long decline of what was once the most powerful religion on Earth.

Bin Laden’s Narrative promises to reverse the decline of the Muslim community (the umma) and to triumph over Western imperialism using jihad (holy war). A related goal of the Taliban was to restore the Caliphate.

Ideological purity is an important element in justifying unlimited means” in war. The Qur’ran speaks against making war on civilians, women and children, and other innocents, but the claimed religious purity of al Qaeda followers is used as a justification for such atrocities.

The Narrative is part truth, part myth, and very effective in gaining followers. Counterinsurgency aims to separate the truth from the myth.

A coming post on Counterinsurgency 103 will discuss some of the insurgencies’ vulnerabilities and possibly get into an overview of COIN methods.