Counterinsurgency 103, Insurgencies Have Vulnerabilities

I began posting on this site by stating that General Petraeus’ current war strategy in Iraq would not work because he has less than half of the troops required, according to the Army and Marines own field manual, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This field manual was produced under the command and with the active participation of Petraeus. In Counterinsurgency 101 and Counterinsurgency 102, I discussed the nature of insurgencies and how they operate – for the most part it was a listing of all their advantages. Also, no Western power has completely defeated a modern insurgency. One should wonder if it is possible to defeat these new, vicious, and dedicated insurgencies.

There are many reasons to doubt that Western countries have the national will power and stamina to combat these radical jihadist insurgencies. But we can begin by analyzing their vulnerabilities. FM 3-24 lists eight areas of vulnerability within these insurgencies:

• Need for secrecy
• Inconsistencies in the mobilization message
• Need for a base of operations
• Reliance on external support
• Need for financial resources
• Internal divisions or conflict
• Need to maintain momentum
• Informants within the insurgency

If it hasn’t been clear before, I need to state that I am taking the topics from FM 3-24, but my discussion is partly from that manual and partly from my own studies.

Need for secrecy: Insurgencies are militarily weak in the beginning and remain weak for a significant portion of their lifespan. Secrecy is essential during this period to counter the inherent weakness, but secrecy can be counterproductive since it can limit freedom of action, distort the movement’s message and hamper internal communications. This is one reason some insurgencies split into a combat element and a political element (see Counterinsurgency 102 for a description of the elements). One familiar example of this split is Sinn Fein (political wing) and the IRA (combat wing) in Ireland. FM 3-24 notes that Hamas and Hezbollah also use this split.

Inconsistencies in the mobilization message: Young insurgencies need members and will use a variety of different messages and intimidation to gain followers. They will often overreach with both techniques and contradictions will surface. Intimidation may become excessive force, turning the populace against the insurgents. Counterinsurgency forces can often turn the conflicting messages against the insurgents. FM 3-24 makes note of using moderate clerics against radical clerics when fighting a religiously extreme insurgency.

Need for a base of operations: In Iraq much of the country is available to the insurgents, but they must still carefully choose operating bases. Placing a base close to cities and the focus of combat is best for combat operations but is also vulnerable to discovery and attack. On the other hand, a base place in the countryside may be safer, but too far removed to be efficient. Counterinsurgents try to exploit this problem. As I follow the current operations in Iraq, I notice some special pride when our forces discover bases of operations such as IED factories. It appears that we are effectively exploiting this vulnerability. Counterinsurgents also need to look out for bases placed on the soil of neighboring countries.

Reliance on external support: Nearly all insurgencies rely on external support, sometimes extensively. International insurgencies like al Qaeda recognize no national borders. FM 3-24 does not discuss the difficulty of attacking or removing external support bases in other countries, at least as far as I’ve read. Counterinsurgents can, however, interdict the flow of personal and supplies moving to and from those bases.

Need for financial resources: Nearly all insurgencies rely on external financial resources. Patrons may impose restrictions that are inconsistent with the insurgents ideals and the patrons themselves are open to pressure from their own nations. Insurgents often work with criminal and drug organizations. Any connections with criminals detracts from the movements ideals and there may be significant conflicts between the insurgents and the criminals. In the months following 9/11 the United States conducted a very effective campaign to severe al Qaeda’s financial connections. The campaign was also effective in locating and capturing several top al Qaeda leaders.

Internal divisions or conflict: Insurgency movements will contain internal divisions or conflicts. The divisions and conflicts may range from minor to consequential and are exacerbated by the separation of the movement into semi-independent cells. Leaders may be questioned by others and sometimes there may be a competition for leadership. Successful counterinsurgency operations will often widen those divisions and inflame conflicts.

Need to maintain momentum: As our forces have moved to warfare that prizes maneuver and mobility, they understand the importance of momentum. Insurgents also need to maintain momentum but sometimes that momentum is lost due to problems within the movement or by successful counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgents can take the strategic initiative when the insurgents lose momentum.

Informants within the insurgency: Although insurgency leaders, combatants, and political cadre may not usually be informants, the auxiliaries and population base can and often will become informants. When we hear of possible amnesties for insurgents, this is often aimed at gaining informants rather offering a blanket appear to their leaders, combatants, and the political cadre. The hard part is that informants must believe that they and their extended families will be protected from reprisals, something we’ve not been able to promise in Iraq.

I find this list of vulnerabilities somewhat troubling. It is troubling because I don’t find the usual military objectives except enemy bases, troop and supply movements, and force momentum. I say, “the usual” objectives, but the list also describes the vulnerabilities of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army in a war that I do remember intimately. The Viet Cong insurgency was probably the most sophisticated insurgent movement in the world of the 1960s and our military did not understand it or react to it.

The U.S. Army likes to use the terms “full spectrum warrior” and “full spectrum operations.” The essence of this new terminology is an Army that does more than just combat. FM 3-24 describes full spectrum in terms of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The manual also separates these functions from peacekeeping operations which have a lack of violence as the primary goal. The primary goal of counterinsurgency operations is stability of the host nation’s government, but offensive and defensive operations are an integral part of the full spectrum. There should be little question that our forces excel at offensive operations. While the defense of individual troops is problematic, the defense of the military force as a whole should be quite easy. This leaves the question of how well we perform counterinsurgency operations.

Our troops are now demonstrating that they understand and can perform effective counterinsurgency operations. Any failing I see is in the lack of numbers of troops and not in their skills. But I also wonder just how far we can go in training our troops in these full spectrum operations. We continue to have shortfalls in intelligence and language skills. Further, current deployment schedules do not allow enough time to train the troops and this is in the middle of operations that require more diverse training than ever before.

We excel at precision bombing, we are learning that any level collateral damage is to be avoided, and we are learning to let our troops think and respond to conditions at the local level. But in the end, the military force is still a relatively blunt weapon when it is most effective. Counterinsurgency operations place a remarkable level of commitment to understanding the sensitivities of the local citizens. It will be difficult for each soldier or Marine to retain such sensitivities when confronted by the depraved violence of insurgents, most of whom are indistinguishable from the local populace. In Iraq we see the very few soldiers and Marines react to violence with unreasoned violence in return, but it takes only a few to obliterate the positive actions of the great majority of troops.

Counterinsurgency 104 will talk a little more about full spectrum war and provide some indications of where we might have to deploy our troops in the future.