Small Wars Journal and Operations in Iraq

Since writing my first two posts I found a great web site called Small Wars Journal. This site is operated by John Nagl and others who were involved in the development of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency and has many articles on COIN.

A recent post “Understanding Current Operations in Iraq” by Dave Kilcullen gives a very good summary on the purpose of the current operations around Baghdad and Baquaba. It generated many comments, some of which are, as I feared – by persons who had not taken the time to understand insurgencies or COIN operations.

I believe that FM 3-24 does provide a good understanding of insurgencies, their histories, and the phases that different kinds of insurgencies go through. I haven’t yet read the sections dealing with COIN so I cannot comment on the that part. I do believe, however, that the current COIN operations and the troop surge is doomed to failure and I posted a comment to that effect. The general in command of the operations said recently that 80% of the insurgents had escaped before the operations began.

Kilcullen excused the escape as, “The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why claims that “80% of AQ leadership have fled” don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather to drive them off the population and keep them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return.”

With only 5 brigades covering all of Iraq outside the area of these COIN operations and with a plan to leave Iraq after the government and Iraqi army stand up, the escape of nearly all insurgents in one area is indicative of failure. As I understand COIN operations, protecting the citizens means that you must protect all citizens who might harbor terrorists or insurgents. And FM 3-24 is very clear that it will takes years to find and neutralize the terrorists and insurgents.

It is possible that the area around Baghdad might be safer (and the reduced civilian death rate seems to bear that out) and that the government might finish the business of forming a government (and that too might be happening with yesterday’s announcement of an agreement on oil sharing). But al Qaeda is still in Iraq, the Mahdi army still exists, even if temporarily silent, and the Sunni/Shia differences remain raw.

The American mood is decidedly against keeping our troops in Iraq much longer, must less approving further buildups. Anyway, our Army and Marines, the Reserves, and National Guard are stretched beyond reasonable limits (Colin Powell says, “broken.”)

Al Qaeda can renew their operations in many Sunni dominated areas, but they’ve been most effective in urban settings so I expect them to pop up in places like the once hotly contested Mosul where one U.S. brigade now covers a large area. Al Sadr remains in charge of perhaps the largest and most organized insurgent force, the Mahdi Army. Al Sadr also remains convinced he should play a critical roll in or even lead a new Iraq.

My fear is that the coming failure will be seen as a failure of the ideas in FM 3-24 and interest in organizing for effective COIN operations will dwindle. If so, we will continue to make the mistakes of Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq. We will also lose in Afghanistan.

I may be negative on the success of the current operations, but I do see some benefit. If the Bush Administration is planning to show military success leading to an agreed upon Iraqi government (no matter how temporary), claim victory and pull out, then the current operations will have served this Administration’s purpose. Blame for eventual failure will fall on the Iraqis.

If that is the case, then the complexity of COIN operations might serve as a warning to future foreign adventures. We might start picking our battles more carefully.

The concepts distilled into FM 3-24 are important, but they also require a mindset that may not be compatible with American ideals. We want to believe that others want freedom and democracy and that America is poised to promote those ideals throughout the world. Yet COIN operations consider stability of nations above all other concerns, whether those nations are under a democratic or authoritarian government.

I think it is important that the Americans become familiar with the concepts in FM 3-24 and I intend to provide highlights of these concepts in future posts.