Counterinsurgency 104, More on Full Spectrum War

In Counterinsurgency 103 I ended that post with a reference to the broad range of new requirements that today’s war fighting places on the full spectrum warrior. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, describes full spectrum war as including offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It also notes that counterinsurgency operations are mostly stability oriented but also include the other two areas of war fighting.

And the manual notes that stability operations are not peacekeeping operations which have the goal of minimizing violence. I think that is a good point to remember or we might confuse the two since the media seems unable to distinguish the two requirements. FM 3-24 gives a good example of Baghdad in 2003. At that time, Sadr City, the source of most of the Shia-driven violence around Baghdad, was fairly quiet. However, in this case the quiet was not the result of peacekeeping operations. The insurgents were preparing for high-tempo violence to follow.

Where, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, might we be fighting these wars? FM 3-24 discusses indicators of legitimacy of a government (in the eyes of its citizens). Six indicators are listed (underlines are mine):

• The ability to provide security for the populace
• Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace
• A high level of popular participation in or support for political processes
• A culturally acceptable level of corruption
• A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development
• A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions

Simply put, if a government scores high on all these factors then it will probably enjoy the support of its people. I note that none of these indicators mention American ideals, in fact they leave lots of room for practices that we might find offensive. The key phrases are “culturally acceptable,’ ‘popular participation,” and “substantial majority” of the citizens of that nation or state.

FM 3-24 does not discuss candidate states and it should not. However, for those interested in states where we might become involved I point you to the Failed States Index, produced by the Fund for Peace and used by our Department of State and published annually in the Foreign Policy magazine. The indicators that go into a failed state are:

Social Indicators
I-1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
I-2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating
Complex Humanitarian Emergencies
I-3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia
I-4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

Economic Indicators
I-5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines
I-6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

Political Indicators
I-7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
I-8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
I-9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread
Violation of Human Rights
I-10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"
I-11. Rise of Factionalized Elites
I-12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

These indicators are remarkably similar to FM 3-24’s indicators of legitimacy. They differ only in that the Failed States indicators are somewhat more specific. In my own words, a failed state is one where the government is either not functioning (pick any Horn of Africa country) or is widely opposed by its citizens (Algeria under French control) to the extent that an insurgency is either ongoing or likely to begin. The index simply draws a line at a score of 90 with any country scoring over 90 higher considered critical. Those states in the top category were once called “Failed States.” Today they are referred to as critical states. The next lower category with scores 60 to 90 are danger states, once called “Failing States.”

Note that Iraq is number 2 after Sudan. Afghanistan comes in at number 8. Pakistan, probably the most scary nation with pro-jihadist nuclear scientists and a growing jihadist movement including the Taliban and al Qaeda, is another danger state at number 12. These are our friends. While African states are well represented in the danger and critical categories, there are also several states with large Islamic populations.

Pakistan makes an interesting example of possible counterinsurgency action, especially since recent crackdowns on extremist have made the country less stable. In the beginning of my posts I noted that FM 3-24 makes an overall estimate of troops required for counterinsurgency as 20 troops for each 1,000 in the population. For Iraq that comes to about 50 combat brigades. The surge expanded the 15 brigades to 20, less than half to the Army/Marines’ stated need. Iraq had a population of about 27.5 million (less now due to the mass exodus of the middle class). Pakistan has a population of about 164.7 million or about 6 times the size of Iraq. This essentially says that we have no counterinsurgency solutions for any problems in Pakistan. Even if we were to increase the size of our military to its maximum size before 9/11, we would still be unable to do anything.

This ends the Counterinsurgency 10X series. I’ve covered about all of FM 3-24’s overview of counterinsurgency. Subsequent chapters deal with specifics. I might discuss some of the remainder of FM 3-24, but not as part of a series.