Problems with the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Theory

I've watched the good news coming from Anbar and Dyala provinces and I'm just not convinced the picture is all that rosy. Much of what I read are war blogs by soldiers and Marines. Most are upbeat and I see a change in attitude that goes something like, “Finally we have a good military plan and the right top brass and the tide is turning.” Reports by the media also indicate that things are indeed going better around Baghdad, Baquaba, and parts of Dyala and Anbar Provinces. But I hear nothing about the rest of Iraq.

The new Army/Marine field manual, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, seems to be on the right track and a definite improvement over our failed counterinsurgency practices in the past. But I have some serious problems with the requirements that FM 3-24 places on the American people who, in the end, must support these operations. I also have some problems with the military’s ability to develop the language skills required in these intelligence intensive operations.

Number of Troops: I started these posts with an analysis that, according to the troop density requirements specified in FM 3-24, page 23*, we need about 50+ brigades in Iraq. The surge gives us only 20 brigades. Somewhere in my analysis I noted that I assumed a full combat brigade of 9,500 troops. The 9,500 number was taken from a recent Army Times article. It seems there are now 165,000 troops in Iraq. If all those troops are in combat brigades then a typical brigade would be 8,062. If so FM 3-24 would call for about 58 brigades and we still only have 20 brigades. Further, not all those 165,000 are in combat brigades, so the counterinsurgency requirement is even higher. Also, my calculations used the lower figure of 20 troops per 1000 residents, so the requirement may be even higher.

(* I quote from the manual: ”Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.” Underline is mine.)

Fifteen brigades are involved in operations around Baquaba and Baghdad (true in July, but may be somewhat different at this time) and that leaves only 5 brigades to cover the rest of Iraq. I hope that the current operations give enough breathing space to allow the Maliki government to reach some settlement that would not force our precipitate and complete withdrawal. We do have some options short of a complete withdrawal; they are attractive only in comparison to complete withdrawal; and we need some political solution prior to implementing any one of them.

Let me expand on the number of troops that might be required in future counterinsurgency operations. In Counterinsurgency 104, I introduced the Failed States Index. Here is a table for the top dozen Failed States that shows the approximate population (from the CIA World Factbook) and the number of counterinsurgency troops needed per FM 3-24.

State	Population (rounded to nearest million)		COIN Troops (20 troops per 1000 population)	COIN Brigades (9,500 per brigade)
Sudan	39		780,000	82
Iraq	27		540,000	58
Somalia	9		180,000	19
Zimbabwe	12		240,000	25
Chad	10		200,000	21
Cote D’Ivoire	18		360,000	38
Dem. Rep. of Congo	68		1,360,000	143
Afghanistan	32		640,000	67
Guinea	10		200,000	21
Cent. African Republic	4		80,000	8
Haiti		9	180,000	19
Pakistan		168	3,360,000	354

In theory, our current maximum of 20 brigades would allow us to do some counterinsurgency in only five of the top twelve (Somalia, Chad, Guinea, Central African Republic, and Haiti). Note that we could not simultaneously operate in more than one these countries and we could not also have a conventional war going on at the same time.

I also note that the last Haitian stabilization effort, mostly an international effort, had a troop density of only about 4 or 5 troops to 1,000 citizens. Since that effort was successful, perhaps I should look at that in further depth in a later post.

With all the hype about the Surge, one would think we’ve maxed out on the number of troops our all-volunteer force can attract. However, we fielded a larger Army and Marine force in 1990 per the April 30 latimes.com “Warriors at the Limit” article. The Army force was 750,000 and the Marines were at 197,000 for a total of 947,000. Today, the Army is about 507,000 and the Marines 180,000 for a total of 687,000. If we were to increase our military to this force size, that’s a 38% increase.

Since we’ve done it before, we can assume the U.S. has the capability to field a military force equal to the 1990 level. That would field roughly 27 ½ combat brigades, in addition to other current stateside and foreign deployments. At that level, we could operate in only one additional Failed State of the top dozen. We could also operate simultaneously in Somalia and the Central African Republic. Not a very promising outlook.

A draft seems out of the question and I don’t think the draft is compatible with our Full Spectrum force concept. Such a concept demands the brightest and most dedicated volunteers. A draft cannot promise to fill these requirements. Could we increase our all-volunteer force above the 1990 levels? I think we can but that would be another budget increase to account for the increased troops and for the additional incentives that will be required. It would also mean actually funding current equipment shortfalls plus the additional equipment for the larger force.

This just in: . 'War Czar' Cites Concern for Stress of War on Troops. Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan, otherwise known as the War Czar, said, “And I am concerned that those men and women and the families they represent are under stress as a result of repeated deployments…. There's both a personal dimension of this, where this kind of stress plays out across dinner tables and in living room conversations within these families, and ultimately, the health of the all-volunteer force is going to rest on those sorts of personal family decisions.” And in response to a question on reconstituting the draft, “I think it makes sense to certainly consider it, and I can tell you, this has always been an option on the table, but ultimately, this is a policy matter between meeting the demands for the nation's security by one means or another. Today, the current means of the all-volunteer force is serving us exceptionally well. It would be a major policy shift — not actually a military, but a political policy shift to move to some other course.”

I’ve previously voiced the same concerns on the stress. I agree with him on the draft in that it is a political decision. Our local chapter of the Military Officers Association of America has discussed bringing back the draft. We don’t often agree on much, including the Iraq War, but we do agree on the draft. The draft would be good for the country because we need more voters who actually understand what it means to serve the nation. Most especially we need civilian leaders who understand what it means to send troops into danger. However, the draft would probably lower the overall competence of our defense force.

All of this analysis has used approximate data and the results are certainly not precise. My interest was to develop ballpark estimates. However, I think most will agree that my bare minimum of 50 combat brigades is calculated directly from the minimum requirement in FM 3-24 and that the Surge, which we cannot maintain much longer, falls at only 40% of the minimum need.

I intend to continue this line of questioning counterinsurgency operations as envisioned by our military in my next posts. My planned topics are Duration of Counterinsurgency Operations, Unity of Effort (coordinating military and civilian sectors), Intelligence and Language Skills, Stability Operations or Nation Building?, and Other Options to COIN Operations.