Congress and the Petraeus Report: A Prediction

Gen. Petraeus will not be reporting to Congress. It is now called an Assessment. He will not provide a written report but will brief Congress using illustrations and charts (Powerpoint?). The White House will then write the report. You may believe that the White House has already written that report, but that’s not really necessary. I think we already know what the White House will say, given a long and unchanging history of stay the course, maybe with other methods.

The White House will say the following:

• The Surge is working
• Al Qaeda is on the run (any differences between AQI and al Qaeda will be fudged and it will be implied that all insurgents are al Qaeda)
• We need to keep the Surge a little longer but some troops will start coming home in 2008 (exact date will not be given but spring will be hinted)

With that out of the way, here is what Gen. Petraeus will say:

• The Surge is working and we need to stay a little longer
• The following key measures are showing improvement:
• Civilian deaths are down and security is up in Baghdad, Anbar Province, Diyala Pronvince; and Salah ad Din Province is showing slight but measurable progress. The northern Kurd-controlled provinces remain stable and secure.
• The major cities of Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baquaba, once extremely dangerous and owned by insurgents, are now relatively peaceful.
• Local leaders are working with Coalition forces and reforming local governments.
• The Iraqi Army is slowly expanding and most units are effective to some extent, although most will require U.S. troops for guidance and fire support at least well into 2008. Our training of the Iraqi Army is making the difference. Logistics and support of the Iraqi Army remains a problem with that government incapable of providing such support and with no foreseeable improvement.
• The Iraqi National Police is a disappointment with leadership and ranks filled with Shia extremists. Citizens fear the INP.
• The central government is barely functioning and there has been no progress toward essential political goals, although 3 of 18 goals were partially met.
• Operations against Shia insurgents are just now beginning. We cannot, at this time, determine the success or failure of these operations.
• Recommendations:
• Continue on the present military course and maintain the Surge level into 2008. Reductions in troop levels can begin in January or February with one brigade. The remaining 4 Surge brigades can be sent stateside slowly beginning March-April 2008.
• A force level of 130,000 troops should remain in Iraq for at least the next 12 to 18 months with a reassessment at the end of that period
• The Iraqi Army will continue to improve and will take over security from Coalition forces. Our withdrawals should be keyed to improvements in the Iraqi Army.
• The State Department should continue pressures on Syria and Iran to stop supplying Iraqi insurgents and otherwise meddling in Iraqi matters.

Those Republicans who continue to support the President and his war (still a majority of Republicans) have little room to maneuver and will probably show support by asking Gen. Petraeus to elaborate on the positive parts of his assessment. Democrats also have little maneuvering room. They cannot again threaten to decrease funding – been there, done that, didn’t work. They will question the negative aspects of the General’s assessment and will push for a more definitive plan and schedule for the drawdown to troops.

Democrats will ask the following questions or make the following points:

• The security for most Iraqi citizens has not improved. Will there be a change?
• They will know that the current operations are “clear and hold” and that there are not enough troops to significantly extend the current operations while holding our current successes.
• Local tribal chiefs who support the Coalition are primarily Sunni and we’ve gained that support by arming them. Isn’t it likely they will turn against us in the near future? (Petraeus will probably admit to that possibility but will point out that what we have now is far better than our past whack-a-mole campaign against AQI.
• Having the Iraqi Army stand up as we stand down is important. Can we speed up that schedule? When can we transition our forces from the current operations to one of just training? (Petraeus must fudge an answer to this since it is not in the foreseeable future but he should not fully admit to that).
• The Chairman and others in the JCS, have said that we cannot sustain the Iraq troop levels beyond March-April 2008. How does that mesh with your operational plans?
• Tell us more about your relationship with the Iraqi government and specifically Maliki. What specific actions on the part of that government do you need to start bringing our troops home?
• Do you recommend we disband the Iraqi National Police? (Petraeus will probably say that that should be a decision of the Iraqi government, which it is. If pressed Petraeus might hint that we’ve already begun to promote and support local protection forces who are trusted by local citizens.)
• General, we have made no progress against the Shiite militias who are greater in number than the AQI. Muqtada al Sadr has little control over most of these groups and they are spreading terror over much of Iraq. Do you have the troops to do anything about that? What is the state of the British troops in Basra? (I think Petraeus will be basically honest on this part and admit we can do little more outside our current operational area and that the British, while pulling back, are steadfast. The General should also note that we are doing something about the Shiite militias in Baghdad.)

There may then be a Congressional push for an agreed upon troop withdrawal schedule. I think they are fully aware that most voters want some kind of bipartisan action. Whether any bipartisan effort can overcome the fringe non-compromisers is doubtful but the message will still be sent to the White House. The President will agree on a schedule for the first brigade withdrawal; he may even promise a date earlier than Congress hints at. However, the President will erect a smoke screen around further withdrawals.

Those are my predictions but, for the most part, they are just a somewhat organized repeat of what we already know. Deciding on the correct future path is no easier than it was several months ago. There is no question that Petraeus and his troops and officers have made remarkable progress that should have led to significant political action in Baghdad. It didn’t and our forces are just about near their limit of expanding operations, and well beyond their limit in the length and size of this deployment.

At first I was very negative on the Surge and I stick by my first assessment that we did not have enough troops to succeed in counterinsurgency in Iraq – that was based on specific troop requirements as stated in FM 3-24, the Army/Marines counterinsurgency manual which was developed under General Petraeus’ command and in which he actively participated. As it turns out I was off by half and my estimate of the requirement should have been more like 100 brigades than the 50+ I stated. I had used a brigade size of 9,500 men as per two strategic think tank sites. The definition of a brigade changes and so does the level but it appears a brigade in Iraq is only about 4,000.

At first I didn’t understand the scope of operations and that they were purposefully limited to controlling Baghdad by also controlling the surrounding areas, and to build on previous successes in Anbar Province. The goal was limited and directed to creating conditions for the Iraqi government to make political progress. Given those limitations, the Surge was remarkably successful in military terms. But there has been no political progress. In fact there are enough indicators that the political situation is even more deadlocked and Maliki’s government may be imploding.

Gen. Petraeus has, at least twice, expressed his dissatisfaction with the Maliki government and has just recently said that the Surge has had uneven success (letter to his troops). Those statements are significant in two respects. First, the problems with the Maliki government have come from Petraeus and, apparently not so much from Amb. Crocker. I’m not sure of the significance of this but it seems oddly reversed. Second, having Petraeus telegraph uneven success in the very few days prior to his assessment to Congress is a bad sign.

I have also stated that the success or failure of the new counterinsurgency will not be determined by this Surge since it does not cover the entire country. I hope that any perceived failure of the Surge does not reflect on the theory.