Sunni Insurgents Have Problems

This is a note of some hope in our Iraq War. Sunni jihadist insurgencies may be failing because of problems they created. The Counterterrorism Blog has a most interesting post that gives perspective to some of their problems. “Khawaarij and Jihad: Is Al-Qaida's Network in Iraq Doomed to the Fate of the GIA?” recounts some recent verbal exchanges between the Sunni insurgent groups. Even bin Laden’s master planner, al-Zawahiri, has bad mouthed Hamas. I recommend reading the whole article.

The article relates these exchanges to the collapse of the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) in Algeria in the mid-1990s. That movement began, like our current insurgents in Iraq, with denunciations and killings of apostates and infidels. As newer, younger, and more radical commanders took over the movement their targets expanded to include anyone who disagreed with them. Not only did they lose their base support, but they also angered their own fighters and the movement broke into warring factions and eventually disintegrated.

In Iraq, we see the public rejecting al Qaeda in Anbar, Dyala, and other Sunni-dominated provinces. More recently we’ve heard verbal exchanges between Sunni insurgents in Iraq and between al Qaeda and Hamas. The article points to clashes between Iraqi groups based on the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi-jihadists, and between al Qaeda supported groups and the al Qaeda upper echelons. I think we can assume that Surge success caused some of that bickering, but the history of the GIA indicates that Sunni insurgencies may also fail on their own.

Basically, this is good news for the West but not unqualified good news. We don’t yet know where all this might lead. I see three possible outcomes for Iraq and small wars ahead:

• All Sunni insurgencies die out
• One local insurgency survives and dominates
• One international insurgency gains control of most/all local insurgencies

The first possibility is that all Sunni insurgencies will become so unpopular that they will begin dying out before they achieve much success. I doubt this will happen. The anger and conditions that give life to such movements will be around for years and I see various insurgencies growing in most Islamic countries. Any single insurgent group is certain to find some local acceptance and it may take some time before the local civilians become disenchanted with the insurgents. The al Qaeda-Taliban successes would probably have continued in Afghanistan had we not intervened.

A second possibility is that one insurgent group may dominate the insurgent marketplace and kill off other insurgents or drive them into hiding. There are several countries with budding or active insurgencies and this is certain to happen somewhere, especially in smaller countries or regions where the cause of insurgency is more uniform. If so, then that might lead us to something like Anbar Province where al Qaeda dominated as AQI. If those single insurgencies do learn from mistakes, then they might repeat the mistakes in Anbar and also die out. However, Sunni insurgencies have proven to be intelligent and we should expect them to revise their hardball tactics against the local populace. We should expect some insurgencies will find that successful line between terror and support.

A third possibility is that one, or a small few, international insurgent organizations such as al Qaeda will exert more central control over local insurgencies. This would have the advantage of a more unified front against apostates and infidels, better management of resources, and allow more controlled responses to civilian backlash. However, insurgencies (as clearly explained in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Field Manual) are weaker than the opposition through most of their development stages and they must remain secretive and hidden. This requires the very loose, cell-oriented organization wherein the chain of command is also very loose. There can be no firm control over local cells by the upper levels of command and this means that the movement remains somewhat fractured. Internal dissention is part of this kind of organization and this, in turn, can easily lead to the movement being fractured into separate movements.

I’m sure there are other possibilities, but I think the general trend is that Sunni insurgencies, especially the most prominent ones based on the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi mentality, will eventually be degraded by internal problems and may fall under their own weight. We can use this knowledge to our advantage, but this is just one more aspect of counterinsurgency operations that will test our national patience.

I’ve not addressed Shia insurgencies and none of the above may apply to those insurgencies in Iraq. The Shia are a minority within Islam and, although a large minority, are probably more focused on issues so there might fewer dissenting avenues among insurgents. Shia insurgencies may also be more focused because Iran, the only Islamic republic in the Middle East, is Shia and actively supports Shia movements throughout the Middle East (and probably Sunni movements too). It is seems certain that Iraqi Shias have a different agenda than Iran’s, but at this time we really have little idea of what Iran or Iraqi Shias want from the association.