A War We Just Might Win?

A War We Just Might Win? This is a must read from the New York Times by Michael O’Hanlon and Ken Pollack. They recently toured Iraq and came away with different picture. They saw many success of the surge, not the least of which is a renewed morale of our troops. The troops believe they now have the right commanders and that they are on the right track. Here are a few exerpts:

“In Baghdad’s Ghazaliya neighborhood, which has seen some of the worst sectarian combat, we walked a street slowly coming back to life with stores and shoppers. The Sunni residents were unhappy with the nearby police checkpoint, where Shiite officers reportedly abused them, but they seemed genuinely happy with the American soldiers and a mostly Kurdish Iraqi Army company patrolling the street.”

“far more Iraqi units are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Iraqi Army’s highly effective Third Infantry Division started out as overwhelmingly Kurdish in 2005. Today, it is 45 percent Shiite, 28 percent Kurdish, and 27 percent Sunni Arab.

” The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus’s determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave.”

The two authors bills themselves as highly critical of the Bush war management, so that seems to give them the right to tell us when things are going right. I’m not familiar with O’Hanlon, but Pollack has been around war planning and commenting for some time. I’ve never considered him anti-Bush war management, but he usually makes sense so I must trust him on this report.

The report notes that the situation remains grave and that we should remain in Iraq at least until 2008. My own opinion is to wait at least until September for Gen. Petraeus’ report before committing to a withdrawal schedule.

While searching the news, I read several reports on the conditions in Iraq. Since those reports were not my main focus, I didn’t make notes but I did evaluate the articles for authenticity as best I could. I did get an overall feeling that the conditions in Iraq, as seen by others, was not nearly as upbeat as the New York Times article. Civilian deaths are only down by 1/3 – good, but still pretty high. Seventy percent of the children are not getting enough food (but not malnourished, I guess). And a lot of other bad news. I add this note only to show how difficult it is to get an accurate picture of the conditions in Iraq and the progress of our surge.

Counterinsurgency 103, Insurgencies Have Vulnerabilities

I began posting on this site by stating that General Petraeus’ current war strategy in Iraq would not work because he has less than half of the troops required, according to the Army and Marines own field manual, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This field manual was produced under the command and with the active participation of Petraeus. In Counterinsurgency 101 and Counterinsurgency 102, I discussed the nature of insurgencies and how they operate – for the most part it was a listing of all their advantages. Also, no Western power has completely defeated a modern insurgency. One should wonder if it is possible to defeat these new, vicious, and dedicated insurgencies.

There are many reasons to doubt that Western countries have the national will power and stamina to combat these radical jihadist insurgencies. But we can begin by analyzing their vulnerabilities. FM 3-24 lists eight areas of vulnerability within these insurgencies:

• Need for secrecy
• Inconsistencies in the mobilization message
• Need for a base of operations
• Reliance on external support
• Need for financial resources
• Internal divisions or conflict
• Need to maintain momentum
• Informants within the insurgency

If it hasn’t been clear before, I need to state that I am taking the topics from FM 3-24, but my discussion is partly from that manual and partly from my own studies.

Need for secrecy: Insurgencies are militarily weak in the beginning and remain weak for a significant portion of their lifespan. Secrecy is essential during this period to counter the inherent weakness, but secrecy can be counterproductive since it can limit freedom of action, distort the movement’s message and hamper internal communications. This is one reason some insurgencies split into a combat element and a political element (see Counterinsurgency 102 for a description of the elements). One familiar example of this split is Sinn Fein (political wing) and the IRA (combat wing) in Ireland. FM 3-24 notes that Hamas and Hezbollah also use this split.

Inconsistencies in the mobilization message: Young insurgencies need members and will use a variety of different messages and intimidation to gain followers. They will often overreach with both techniques and contradictions will surface. Intimidation may become excessive force, turning the populace against the insurgents. Counterinsurgency forces can often turn the conflicting messages against the insurgents. FM 3-24 makes note of using moderate clerics against radical clerics when fighting a religiously extreme insurgency.

Need for a base of operations: In Iraq much of the country is available to the insurgents, but they must still carefully choose operating bases. Placing a base close to cities and the focus of combat is best for combat operations but is also vulnerable to discovery and attack. On the other hand, a base place in the countryside may be safer, but too far removed to be efficient. Counterinsurgents try to exploit this problem. As I follow the current operations in Iraq, I notice some special pride when our forces discover bases of operations such as IED factories. It appears that we are effectively exploiting this vulnerability. Counterinsurgents also need to look out for bases placed on the soil of neighboring countries.

Reliance on external support: Nearly all insurgencies rely on external support, sometimes extensively. International insurgencies like al Qaeda recognize no national borders. FM 3-24 does not discuss the difficulty of attacking or removing external support bases in other countries, at least as far as I’ve read. Counterinsurgents can, however, interdict the flow of personal and supplies moving to and from those bases.

Need for financial resources: Nearly all insurgencies rely on external financial resources. Patrons may impose restrictions that are inconsistent with the insurgents ideals and the patrons themselves are open to pressure from their own nations. Insurgents often work with criminal and drug organizations. Any connections with criminals detracts from the movements ideals and there may be significant conflicts between the insurgents and the criminals. In the months following 9/11 the United States conducted a very effective campaign to severe al Qaeda’s financial connections. The campaign was also effective in locating and capturing several top al Qaeda leaders.

Internal divisions or conflict: Insurgency movements will contain internal divisions or conflicts. The divisions and conflicts may range from minor to consequential and are exacerbated by the separation of the movement into semi-independent cells. Leaders may be questioned by others and sometimes there may be a competition for leadership. Successful counterinsurgency operations will often widen those divisions and inflame conflicts.

Need to maintain momentum: As our forces have moved to warfare that prizes maneuver and mobility, they understand the importance of momentum. Insurgents also need to maintain momentum but sometimes that momentum is lost due to problems within the movement or by successful counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgents can take the strategic initiative when the insurgents lose momentum.

Informants within the insurgency: Although insurgency leaders, combatants, and political cadre may not usually be informants, the auxiliaries and population base can and often will become informants. When we hear of possible amnesties for insurgents, this is often aimed at gaining informants rather offering a blanket appear to their leaders, combatants, and the political cadre. The hard part is that informants must believe that they and their extended families will be protected from reprisals, something we’ve not been able to promise in Iraq.

I find this list of vulnerabilities somewhat troubling. It is troubling because I don’t find the usual military objectives except enemy bases, troop and supply movements, and force momentum. I say, “the usual” objectives, but the list also describes the vulnerabilities of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army in a war that I do remember intimately. The Viet Cong insurgency was probably the most sophisticated insurgent movement in the world of the 1960s and our military did not understand it or react to it.

The U.S. Army likes to use the terms “full spectrum warrior” and “full spectrum operations.” The essence of this new terminology is an Army that does more than just combat. FM 3-24 describes full spectrum in terms of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The manual also separates these functions from peacekeeping operations which have a lack of violence as the primary goal. The primary goal of counterinsurgency operations is stability of the host nation’s government, but offensive and defensive operations are an integral part of the full spectrum. There should be little question that our forces excel at offensive operations. While the defense of individual troops is problematic, the defense of the military force as a whole should be quite easy. This leaves the question of how well we perform counterinsurgency operations.

Our troops are now demonstrating that they understand and can perform effective counterinsurgency operations. Any failing I see is in the lack of numbers of troops and not in their skills. But I also wonder just how far we can go in training our troops in these full spectrum operations. We continue to have shortfalls in intelligence and language skills. Further, current deployment schedules do not allow enough time to train the troops and this is in the middle of operations that require more diverse training than ever before.

We excel at precision bombing, we are learning that any level collateral damage is to be avoided, and we are learning to let our troops think and respond to conditions at the local level. But in the end, the military force is still a relatively blunt weapon when it is most effective. Counterinsurgency operations place a remarkable level of commitment to understanding the sensitivities of the local citizens. It will be difficult for each soldier or Marine to retain such sensitivities when confronted by the depraved violence of insurgents, most of whom are indistinguishable from the local populace. In Iraq we see the very few soldiers and Marines react to violence with unreasoned violence in return, but it takes only a few to obliterate the positive actions of the great majority of troops.

Counterinsurgency 104 will talk a little more about full spectrum war and provide some indications of where we might have to deploy our troops in the future.

I Thought the National Guard Was a Reserve Force

While drafting my Counterinsurgency 103 I was sidetracked by (among other things) “No Longer in Reserves” by William Mathews in the August issue of Military Officer, as house magazine for the Military Officers Association of America (MOAA). The article starts with the experience of 1^st Sgt. Randy Hatch who will be deployed for 22 or 23 months depending on when he actually returns stateside.

Sgt. Hatch was angry but mostly because his unit was being extended in country again. He sent a 4 a.m. email to President Bush, saying, “You’ll never get our soldiers back once we finally get them home.” That concerns me. As I’ve stated before, our new kind of Army and Marines depend on recruiting and retaining the highest caliber of men and women. If they do leave and convince their neighbors not to join, then we will have a problem.

Senior officers in the Guard and Reserves have complained about a rotation schedule that promised two years at home, but now is allowing less than one year at home. They also gripe about the shortage of equipment (average down to about 44% desired inventory when around 76% is normal) and they say there is not enough time to properly train for combat operations.

But DOD claims enlistments are ok, even though they’ve dropped their standards. I couldn’t find any firm or recent figures on retention. The media prints a sad picture, but again, no hard figures are shown. I’m not convinced the problem is real, at least for now.

In the article everyone seems to agree that these rotation schedules are hardest on the families. Civilians may not grasp the extent of these hardships. It’s not just that the service member is gone and in real danger for two years. There is also the loss of income (Plus, the Pentagon also stopped paying the $1,000/month to Guard members involuntary deployed.), but there is also the support that regular Army and Marines get and the Guard doesn’t. That includes lower priced groceries at commissaries, medical and dental care, and a host of other needs. While these benefits are available to Guard families if they live near a base that has those facilities, most families are hours away from bases.

The article also presents the other side of the coin. Many in the Guard joined to be part of the action. Others who have not been in the combat zone actually want to go. If I remember back to my combat zone days, those who are trained for actually want an opportunity to put that training to use. Col. Richard Curry, commander of the 37^th BCT Ohio, said, “A lot of young people are looking at what’s going on and want to have that experience.” It seems our troops are handling these unfair rotations for now.

The Reserves and Guard were originally planned to serve as a deployable force in the event of a major war or major threat to the United States. This idea went out the window with the all-volunteer force. The all-volunteer was conceived as a reduced force and that it would be regularly expanded by Reserve and Guard units. Over the last several years, the Army Reserve and Guard have supplied around 45% of the total Army force. I read somewhere that the percentange in now 52%. Since the Reserves and Guard have daytime jobs, they were promised a minimum of two years at home. Not any more.

It seems the White House is already playing down Gen. Petraeus’ September briefing and intends to “stay the course” regardless of any advice he might get from those military commanders that he trusts so much. The Democrats have already reacted to his briefing even though he hasn’t given it yet. It’s times like this that remind me why I retired from the Navy soon after Vietnam. I would never have made a good admiral – don’t like being a political football.

But the thing that troubles me most is the lack of equipment for the Reserves and Guard. I’ve supported the DAV and similar organizations for years but I’ve recently tried to add support to agencies that help troops in the combat zone and their families. During my internet search I read quite a few troop emails requesting goodies, toiletry kits and the like. The requests didn’t end with the usual niceties not available in combat zones. I was appalled by the number of requests for body armor, and weapons – even M16s. What kind of government sends our troops into combat without weapons, body armor, and Humvee armor?

The Soviet Union sent troops into battle without weapons during the counteroffensives at the battle of Stalingrad. They knew that those recruits would soon pick up weapons from their fallen comrades. We can do better. A country which can afford tax cuts to the rich can certainly afford to equip its troops.

If anyone else out there wants to support the troops with more than yellow ribbons, check out the “Support Our Troops” links on the right. There are many sites like the ones I’ve listed but, for some reason, I liked these better. America Supports You is a good place to start and has links to lots of organizations. AnySoldier lets you either donate a dollar amount or pick some packages that are sent directly to troops that you can specify from a list of names. Note than none of these sites, for privacy reasons, allow direct, initial contact with troops. You can send a brief message and your email address. The soldier, Marine, airman, or sailor can then begin a conversation, if they wish and they usually do wish. I also like the Fisher House Foundation which provides family lodging near hospitals treating wounded soldiers and Marines. My wife and family sacrificed during my career and the Fisher House supports those families during a sacrifice that is far greater than mine was.

I am reminded of that famous statement by Winston Churchill about the RAF: “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.” With only about 0.4% of our population under arms, our troops qualify as the few. We owe them and, if you wish to support our troops while they are serving, please check out some of these web sights.

Support Our Troops

This is a break from counterinsurgency. I’ve tried to write it several times and felt that whatever I might write was still insufficient. But I do care about supporting our troops, their families, and disabled vets. So here’s my attempt.

Things sure have changed since Vietnam. Most cars sport some kind of “Support Our Troops” stickers. Roadside sign tell to support the troops. Yet many of our troops feel that America is no longer supporting them because the majority of American no longer believe in the Iraq War. How can the average citizen support our troops and still be against this war?

When the American public began openly displaying those “Support Our Troops” stickers and American flags, I was happy for the troops. I was even happier when a stranger noticed my Vietnam Veteran license plate and thanked me for my service – the first time ever for me. But I was also a little reserved about all this attention to our troops. I’d seen that support fade more than once. I’d seen an angry public cause a humiliating defeat in Vietnam which ended with a helicopter escape from the roof of our embassy in Saigon. I’d seen public outcries remove troops from the battle zone before the job was completed and with a loss of lives for nothing gained. Would this happen again with Iraq?

I’ve been against the invasion of Iraq since it was obvious the Administration was bent on invading a country that had nothing to do with the terrorists at that time. But we are there and we need to find a workable political solution. The current operations under General Petraeus stand a better chance of finding that solution but past mismanagement of the war by this Administration leaves us few options. My research on counterinsurgency operations strongly indicates we can’t win even with the new operations. I hope I am wrong.

In the meantime I hope America will renew its support of the troops and begin to understand that such support must extend to their families and loved ones. As a start I recommend removing those now faded and torn “Support Our Troops” decals and buy new ones. Remove those dirty and frayed flags from car antennas and buy new ones. Displaying a dirty and frayed flag is an insult to the troops and disrespects the flag.

Next I would ask every American to become acquainted with small war, counterinsurgency operations, or whatever you might like to call this new kind of war. As with the general public, our Congress and much of the Administration has little or no military experience. I don’t think this will change in the near future since the draft seems out of the question barring a major conventional war. Today’s military requires troops with a higher level of intelligence and skill that the draft cannot provide.

A public that understands more about our military and the kind of wars we now fight can also force our civilian leaders to make wiser choices, especially in the coming 2008 election. “Staying the course” is a bankrupt plan, but a mindless withdrawal is equally bankrupt. One of the worst ideas in this war was when we pulled troop back into protected enclaves. I knew the Vietnam War was lost when we did that. A current plan bandied about in Congress is to withdraw the bulk of troops, leaving only a few to “finish” training the Iraqi army and protect borders. Such a plan repeats the protected enclave idea but without the necessary protection.

I have my own ideas on some workable plans but I think we should wait for General Petraeus’ report next month before deciding on any plan. He promised a report. We have the responsibility to wait for it.

In the end, however, our troops may interpret opposition to the war as opposition to their role in that war. We can’t fix that be we can try to understand the commitment our troops made. I’ve often compared military service to ministry. Each member is serving a cause much greater than the himself or herself. For the minister the cause is God’s message. For the service member the cause is the defense of the United States and its ideals. In both cases, the cause comes before self and family. One must believe in that cause and the rightness of it to endure the many kinds of sacrifices of which civilians are only vaguely aware.

The cause and the war become one in the minds of most troops. While citizens against a war does not translate into opposition to the cause, troops will often see it that way. When that happens, the impact on the moral of the troops, their families and their loved can be devastating. I have no solutions, but understanding may help. If you are against this war, please remember that our troops are doing the job they were assigned and that they are doing that job with excellence and dedication.

Finally, if you see a service man or woman take the time to thank them. If they have family or loved ones with them, then thank them also because they too are sacrificing. It takes only a few seconds but the thanks lasts for years.

For some first hand accounts of the sacrifices of military families, please visit Trying to Grok.

Counterinsurgency 102, Elements & Narrative

FM 3-24 describes five elements of any insurgency, making insurgencies far more complex than the media covers. The five elements are:

• Movement leaders
• Combatants
• Political cadre
• Auxiliaries
• Mass base

The media generally reports on only the first two. Combatants gain the most press since these insurgents plant IEDs, use AK-47’s and RPG’s, and commit atrocities against civilians. Press coverage of movements leaders often describes them as solely military leaders. Yet movement leaders are primarily strategic planners and idea people. (See Counterinsurgency 101 for more information on the complex strategic planning used by today’s insurgent movements.) Movement leaders are leaders because they are charismatic and they are effective in expressing movement goals in ways that address the perceived problems of the masses.

The political cadre provide guidance and procedures for the entire movement. If the insurgency is religiously based, the cadre will act as religious and spiritual advisors. The political cadre is in charge of propaganda and seeks to either use existing grievances against the government, or creates the perception of grievances. They will then explain how the insurgency plans to correct those grievances. A favored target is occupation forces.

We have rebuilt the Iraqi infrastructure and, in some cases, actually improved on such things as electricity and sanitation compared to pre-invasion conditions. However, the Iraqi people have higher expectations and we have not met those expectations. Thus they perceive problems that are both imagined and real. The effect is magnified by the main thing we have not provided – security.

Auxiliaries provide safe houses, store weapons and supplies, act as couriers and intelligence gatherers, and provide funding, among other necessary support functions.

The mass base is simply the population that supports the insurgency either through shared beliefs or through coercion. It is difficult for COIN forces to separately identify the mass base from the combatants and the auxiliaries.

I have no information on the relative percentages of each of these elements in the different insurgencies within Iraq. Since the Army and Marines have not expanded their language skills to what is required, I suspect they too have limited knowledge of the size of each element in the Iraqi insurgencies.

Ideas are the prime motivating agent in modern insurgencies. Communicating those ideas is the function of the leaders and political cadres. As noted above, the ideology of an insurgency: 1) explains the problems of the masses in terms the insurgency can solve, and 2) explains how the insurgency will correct those problems.

While most Muslims may have little desire to defeat the West, there is wide-spread anti-Western anger in most Islamic countries. It is then easy for a religiously-based insurgency to provide the masses with:

1. identity
2. purpose
3. community

The mechanism for communicating the idealogy is the Narrative. The narrative is simply a story, often played against history. The Middle East has a long and rich history and that history is familiar to everyone included even the most unschooled person. Their history begins with Mohammed. It is mostly a history of Islam and history outside of Islam is either not covered or is covered only in passing. The history is often false in terms of facts, but it is real to most all Muslims.

Osama bin Laden has a narrative. He was purified in the mountains of Afghanistan and he is now inspiring his followers and punishing the infidels. He and his followers are agents of Islamic history.

Bin Laden, in a video tape aired October 2001, referred to the “humiliation and disgrace” that Islam suffered for “more than eighty years.” (from The Crisis of Islam, Bernard Lewis, Random House, 2003). In the West, there was a scramble to find something of historical significance “more than eighty years” ago, while nearly all in the Middle East immediately recognized the reference. It was the defeat of the Ottoman sultanate by the British and French in 1918. Since the sultan was also recognized as the caliph of all Islam, this was a final and humiliating defeat in the long decline of what was once the most powerful religion on Earth.

Bin Laden’s Narrative promises to reverse the decline of the Muslim community (the umma) and to triumph over Western imperialism using jihad (holy war). A related goal of the Taliban was to restore the Caliphate.

Ideological purity is an important element in justifying unlimited means” in war. The Qur’ran speaks against making war on civilians, women and children, and other innocents, but the claimed religious purity of al Qaeda followers is used as a justification for such atrocities.

The Narrative is part truth, part myth, and very effective in gaining followers. Counterinsurgency aims to separate the truth from the myth.

A coming post on Counterinsurgency 103 will discuss some of the insurgencies’ vulnerabilities and possibly get into an overview of COIN methods.

The Generals Against Still Speak

I just returned from my old stomping grounds around Washington, D.C. My one commenter, Ahab, expressed a hope that other military types would speak out about the Iraq War. I did draft a post on just that topic but never posted it. I thought the post might be too self-serving, but I’ll try a shorter response.

Several retired senior military officers began speaking against a war with Iraq some time before the invasion began. At that time our local chapter of the Military Officers Association of America was split about evenly for and against the war. But even at 50/50 we were far more against the war than the general public. I was against the war even though I did believe Saddam still had biological and chemical WMD. I did not believe he had a credible means of delivering those weapons to the U.S. unless he was in league with al Qaeda, a possibility that I believed was absurd.

Retired officers do speak out, but active officers do not. Why? On the one hand there is job security just as with any civilian job. General Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, spoke out about troop levels to Congress in 2003 and he lost his job. Lt. General Brent Scowcroft was retired but he also held advisory positions to Nixon, Ford, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush. He spoke out against the war before the war and his advisory position was lost in the process.

More importantly, there is a code of conduct within the military about public speaking. Contrary to the belief of many civilians, the military chain of command is not totally authoritarian. Any good commander wants conflicting opinion from his junior officers and a commander usually listens to all sides of an issue. But the decision is the commander’s and he expects his officers to fully execute his orders when he makes a decision and to execute without regard to their personal opinions. The running joke is that you can say about anything to your superior as long as you end it with, “Sir.”

Military officers are generally more aware of history and politics than most civilians and they are active in voting and related political actions. They also discuss politics but never speak in public on those issues. This rule is followed throughout a career, so when one becomes a general or admiral, the rule is not forgotten. In fact it is even more important because of the seniority of position. The military is schooled in and believes in the Constitution and that the military is subordinate to our civilian leaders, especially the Commander-in-Chief.

An officer who publicly speaks out against senior officers, civilian leaders, or public policy will face rejection from members of his own service, no matter how right he might be. It is just not acceptable. I guess that General Petraeus is in this situation now. He is the architect of the new counterinsurgency operations and he is in charge of executing the operations. Yet he must know that we cannot achieve a military win. He also knows that any kind of a win must be political (that’s in FM 3-24 also).

I believe that the September 15 report to Congress was Petraeus’ idea. I guess that he will be honest in that report but he might also sugar-coat his report in the interest of the Commander-in-Chief. It appears to me that there is sufficient progress in Anbar and Dyala provinces to claim progress in all of Iraq, if any of the insurgent groups choose not to increase their tempo of operations in the days before September 15.

The code of public silence doesn’t apply to retired officers. If anyone has kept track, a great many of those who did speak out against the war were generals and admirals who had recent, intimate experience with commands in or near CENTCOM which is the Unified Command which directs the Iraq War. These included General Anthony Zinni (commanded CENTCOM,1997-2000), General Wesley Clark (SACEUR and commander of NATO forces, 1997-2000), Lt. General William Odom (he retired as a 3-star general and then served as director of NSA under Reagan), General Tony McPeak (Air Force Chief of Staff, 1990-1994, co-chairman of Oregon Veterans for Bush in 2000), General Joseph Hoar (commanded CENTCOM, 1991-1994), General John Shalikashvilli (Chairman JCS, 1993-1997). These are only the first six names in my research database. The list goes on.

Is this silence good or bad for America? I have to side with the good option, although I do have reservations in the case of the Iraq War. It is good that our military believes in subordination to our civilian leaders. It is good that our military does not publicly support any one political party or theory.

There is also the question of who would have listened if the generals did speak out. The Bush Administration, along with a complicit Republican Congress, was extremely effective at squelching opposition through calls to patriotism. Many of us who did try to speak out were called unpatriotic by a public that had little knowledge of the war and who remain largely ignorant today.

I am certain that senior military officers did speak against the mismanagement of the war but not publicly. However, we all know how Rumsfeldt and his neocons theorist ignored and belittled those generals. I have to believe that Bush knew and condoned this action. When Bush says that he relies on his commanders’ advice, history shows that to be a lie.

Does America Support Our Military Strategy?

This blog has been operational for about three weeks. It gets a few visitors but no comments. So I’ve been thinking about a redesign in appearance and in the theme and content.

I began with an interest in counterinsurgency operations which is the driving theory behind the current surge of troops in Iraq. There are many web sights dedicated to counterinsurgency operations (see Links for some of the best). It was not my intention to replicate those web sights because they are somewhat esoteric and are tailored to the experts and the troops actually engaged in Iraq.

My intent was to bring some of the ideas to a more general public. I believe this is important because our new national military strategy will necessarily lead to greater risk and casualties for our troops and will require a long-term commitment from the American people, a commitment far longer than we have accepted in any other “small war.” I hoped to present some war fighting theory that will be important to American voters in the coming elections.

I have to guess that I’ve either presented the information badly or that there just isn’t any general interest in this new warfare. As to the first possibility, I believe in brevity. My last tour of duty was at the Navy’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. and was quite good at the one page briefing for admirals, generals, and congressional staffers. But my posts to date have been quite lengthy. However, as in the case of the post on the insurgency approaches, I could see no way to covers all the approaches and keep the post short – although I covered each approach only briefly. Even so, my post may have been too long for casual reading.

As to the second possibility that there isn’t any general interest in the subject, if that is true then that opens up a whole new area of discussion.

I’ve been reading some articles on the future of warfare and whether the Western democracies are capable of fighting the new warfare. It doesn’t look promising. Most of the articles admit that insurgent-driven wars will become more frequent and more threatening to Western democracies. Direct attacks within Western nations will also become more frequent with some writers noting that even the mid-term survival of the West may be in jeopardy as the number of non-assimilating foreigners rises. (Some very good articles are in The American Interest, (some articles required subscription, but I usually read the print version).

Many of these writers also note that combating insurgents in their own countries with ground troops will require lengthy counterinsurgency occupations lasting years and into decades. None of the Western democracies seem to have that kind of staying power at the present time.

America’s role as the only remaining superpower and as the leader of the free world has a nasty side affect that our allies tend not to take action on any front without our taking the lead. But America cannot deal with this problem alone. The European Union may be a disappointment but we need Europe in this battle. We need to renew NATO and other useful military alliances.

Some say that America has no stomach for greater troop casualties. I’m not sure that is really true since the population under arms is less than 1% of our total (0.4% I believe). What is true is that few Americans have any idea of nature of military service or the many sacrifices they and their families make. Congress is a little better off with about 23% having some form of military experience, including such token service similar to that of our President.

The 2008 election may be the most important one in many years. I would like to be assured that our current Congressmen and Senators are discussing the Iraq War because they think we actually need a change of course. Sadly, I feel that most of the discussion is all about November 2008. Too many Republicans are afraid the voters will connect them with an unpopular war and President. The Democrats are afraid that the voters will see that they too have no solutions. Worse, I believe the current Democratic push for action is a fear of being left with responsibility for a withdrawal.

There are exceptions in Congress. As a recovering Republican of some 40 plus years, I’ve had great respect for Senators Lugar and, especially, Warner. I also understand, to some degree, their reluctance to disagree with the President or the Party manifesto early in the war. But I am also disappointed by their not acting when it was needed.

We have an angry voting public. About 71% are mad at the war and the President. But just what are they angry about? I’ve researched the polls and no poll that I can find goes beyond a simplistic, “Are you for or agin the war?” Are those polled just angry at a bullheaded (or principled, depending on your view) President? Are they frustrated by continued fighting in a war that may already be lost?

Perhaps the voting public is more aware of threat of insurgents – more specifically Islamic jihadists. I think there is fear but that fear is not focused. As part of my blog makeover, I hope to get into the future of insurgent wars, the jihadist terrorism threat to the U.S. homeland, the public perceptions the terrorist threat and to still cover the important aspects of counterinsurgencies and other small wars.

I invite your comments on any of these issues as well as the overall presentation of my blog. I’ll be on travel but should be posting again by 26 July.

Counterinsurgency 101

As I’ve noted in my previous posts, the Army and Marines are conducting a new kind of warfare called counterinsurgency or COIN. COIN will involve increased risk for our soldiers and Marines. COIN aims to fight terrorists and related insurgencies by stabilizing shaky governments, often the kinds of governments that may be repugnant to Americans. Because of these factors, I believe it is important for Americans with little military experience to understand something about insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations.

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, is the Army’s and the Marine’s bible and guidebook for understanding insurgencies and performing counterinsurgency operations. This field manual, which was issued in December 2006, was perhaps the most thoroughly vetted field manual ever produced. It distills years of U.S., British, French, and other experiences in fighting counterinsurgencies. Comments and advice from both military and civilian experts were included. It is the best single source for understanding the nature of insurgencies and for countering those insurgencies.

In this and several future posts, I will present and discuss some important highlights from FM 3-24. A pdf version of FM 3-24 is available from many places but try the Combined Arms Center library. I recommend the University of Chicago Press edition available at Amazon.com, Barnes and Noble, and other book sellers. This edition has a very informative introduction by Lt. Colonel John Nagl and an introduction by Sarah Sewall who introduces some of the important national and global implications of this manual.

Before getting into FM 3-24 I’d like to talk about the changing nature of war. As the United States’ developed the technology to conduct massively successful attacks on other countries’ armies, we also moved to a more moral kind of war that involved fewer casualties in both the local civilian population and our troops. The same is true to a lesser extent for much of Europe and some other military powers. But there remains many peoples who have aspirations different from the West.

Since those other peoples cannot hope to defeat the West militarily, they’ve moved on to what is called asymmetric war – one in which the two sides have vastly different capabilities and in which to two sides wage war in completely different ways. The only common factor is technology which allows both to organize and conduct battle in new ways, and allows both sides an equal opportunity to broadcast their message to the world.

Whereas the West upholds a sense of civilized warfare and honors the dignity of human life where possible, insurgents have chosen the opposite path of conducting barbaric war without regard for human life. Whereas the West’s militaries are built to target the enemy’s military, insurgents primarily target civilians whether friend or enemy. This leaves the dilemma for the West of whether to adopt the barbarity of insurgents and thereby descend to their level, or to find other means to combat a threat that may eventually threaten the future of the West and its ideals.

Our combat troops were practicing COIN operations in Iraq before FM 3-24 was published. There were several notable successes in getting the Iraqis on our side. Unfortunately these successes tended to be local and temporary as new units with less COIN expertise replaced them.

FM 3-24 lists six approaches used by insurgents:

1. Conspiratorial
2. Military-focused
3. Protracted popular war
4. Urban
5. Identity-focused
6. Composite and coalition

The conspiratorial approach involves a few leaders with a militant cadre seizing the government. The military-focused approach involves a a military force in an insurrection that seizes the government. Lenin’s Bolshevik Revolution is an example of the first approach, while Che Guevera was active in the second approach in Cuba and other third-world countries. These two approaches are not evident in the world today and they offer little opportunities for COIN operations. I will not discuss these first two approaches.

Acceptance of a government by its people is the key to understanding how these insurgenies begin. A citizenry will accept a government if it provides solutions to their basic needs, even if that government does honor personal liberty or freedom. An authoritarian government or even a dictatorship may be accepted if it provides security and basic services and infrastructure, especially when those factors have been recently missing. Failed or failing states, and other unstable governments cannot provide these essential functions a they become candidates for insurgent takeovers.

The protracted popular war Is the most complex and interesting. Mao Zedong’s insurgency in China is the model for this approach. Mao envisioned three phases. During the first phase, called strategic defensive, the government is stronger than the insurgency and insurgents concentrate on surviving and gaining public support. Terrorism is the their main tool and direct combat is avoided.

The second phase, strategic stalemate, is when the two forces are balanced. Terrorism is replaced by guerilla warfare. Insurgents control some territories and may set up a counter state or government to address the citizens’ needs for security, courts, and basic services. Note here that the insurgents often cause the loss of security and other needs but, using propaganda, the insurgents can also step in to “solve” the problems.

The insurgency will have probably divided into a fighting cadre and a political cadre by the time of the second phase. The political cadre concentrates on undermining the government. In urban areas, the insurgents usually form into loosely connected cells, each of which conducts its own operations and propaganda.

Mao’s third phase was strategic counteroffensive when the insurgents have superiority. The insurgents then transition to conventional military operations and destroy the government’s military and take over the government.

Mao’s insurgency was highly successful. The theory has been modified and refined to fit other situations and cultures. If these phases of a protracted popular war seem familiar, you might be a Vietnam vet. A highly refined version was used by the North Vietnamese and they called it “The Struggle.”

This newer concept is a little difficult to understand but the time is worthwhile because the model for the most sophisticated insurgencies in the world today – the kind our troops are now facing.

The Army explains this modified protracted popular war by invoking the concept of logical lines of operations (LLOs). An insurgency has the singular, overarching goal to topple an existing government and install their own government in its place. To achieve that singular goal, the insurgency will have several strategic goals. LLOs form a sort of plan whereby many diverse techniques of insurgency war will be conducted over time and in different locations but all geared to achieving a strategic goal. The diverse techniques will include terror, guerilla warfare, propaganda, and conventional warfare.

It is difficult for COIN forces to determine the purpose of each individual LLO action since these actions will be diverse in location and time. To COIN forces, the actions may seem unorganized and without a definable goal. Yet the goals do exist.

This modified protracted popular war also allows for failure of specific actions as long as the overall effort still tends toward a strategic goal. For example, if the insurgency fails at guerilla warfare they may revert back to terrorism. The Tet Offensive in 1968 was a military failure but was highly successful in weakening America’s support for the Vietnam War. And the insurgents did win that war.

The current spike in suicide bombings in Iraq as a similar attempt to destroy America’s will to continue. The current operations around Baquaba and Baghdad have apparently been successful except for the escape of 80% of the insurgents. To counter the apparent success, some or all of the insurgent factions simply execute high-visibility terrorist actions, not involving combat troops, in other areas of Iraq.

With the LLOs approach, insurgents might concentrate on killing government officials in one area, providing a shadow government with security in another area, using roadside bombs in another, an so on. What appears to be random acts of violence are in reality part of an overall plan to meet more specific and strategic objectives. FM 3-24 refers to this as a shifting “mosaic war” and notes the difficulty of envisioning the coherent whole.

Personally, I find this LLO description of the protracted popular war as applying to the situation in Iraq, but not going far enough (but I’ve only read half of FM 3-24). As complicated as LLOs sound, the description tends toward a single insurgency or at least insurgents with common or overlapping goals. It also tends to view the citizens as a somewhat monolithic entity, all sharing some common desires. In Iraq we have Shia, Sunni, al Qaeda, and al Qaeda-Sunni insurgent factions, sharing no or very few goals. The Iraqi citizens are divided into opposing Shia and Sunni sectarian values, as well as a multitude of ethnic divisions.

If the protracted popular war seems complicated, then the situation in Iraq seems vastly complicated. If you feel overwhelmed by all this complexity, I recommend a visit to Intel Dump and read the comments. I especially recommend the article and comments on Big Army don't do small wars and The Good Fight. You will find many comments by soldiers and Marines that are fighting in Iraq and these comments are not your usual, short snaps of emotional opinion. The comments are often lengthy, thoughtfully well formed, and to the point of COIN in practice. I think you will be impressed by thought and efforts these NCOs and junior officers are putting into the battle. Had we sent enough troops earlier, I believe these remarkable soldiers and Marines would have given us a free and stable Iraq.

The urban approach is often the most difficult to counter. The Irish Republican Army used this as their main approach. In other places, as in Iraq, it is an important component of a the broader protracted popular war. The urban approach thrives when peoples of different beliefs or social status are thrust together as in cities. Terrorists can then use these normal differences to create disorder, incite sectarian violence, kill government or opposition leaders and otherwise weaken the government, intimidate the people, pin the police and military forces to a protection role and thus allow the terrorist to operate elsewhere, and cause the government to “crack down” and appear to be repressive.

The identity-focused approach is one in which insurgents mobilize the support of parts of a population based on their identity with a religion, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. I do not view this a so much a different approach but as an additional layer tool insurgents use in the other approaches. It has been especially effective in Iraq as part of the protracted popular war.

The last approach mentioned is the composite and coalition approach. This merely notes that insurgents may combine parts of all the other approaches and that the combination will shift over time. Iraq is given as an example and I think this is a catch-all approach that might address my misgivings that the protracted popular war approach did not go far enough in describing the conditions in Iraq.

This post has presented only the top-level, overview of the kinds of insurgencies our troops will face. I think I’ve given enough flavor to demonstrate that insurgencies are complex and that COIN operations involve a level of complexity that is equal to the complexity of conventional war operations.

In future posts, I will talk about the roles assigned to members of an insurgency, and then I will discuss the vulnerabilities of any insurgency.

Breaking the Army

Last December, former Secretary of State (and former Chairman, JCS), Colin Powell said the "active Army is about broken.”

Although I hesitate to differ with Powell, I think that is an overstatement. But I do think that the Army is in deep trouble. The Marines are in a similar situation. I wanted to start a series of posts on the nature of insurgencies and methods of counterinsurgency operations, but I need to put that on hold and discuss the condition of our ground troops.

I’ve already shown in previous posts that the current counterinsurgency operations and the troop surge will not work. Other recent news and some blog posts lead me to believe that our Army and Marines are in serious trouble, mostly because of the extent and duration of operations in Iraq.

There are two central factors working here. First, we have too few Army and Marine ground combat units to prosecute a large-scale insurgency-based war like Iraq. It didn’t have to be a large-scale insurgency-based war but the Bush Administration’s past mistakes allowed it to get that way and that’s the war we have. Second, the troops are running out of critical equipment and that equipment is not being replaced due to budget constraints in Washington, D.C.

The first factor of too few troops involves both numbers and time. We are now fighting one major and one minor war, and have other troops deployed in several regions of the world. The major war is Iraq and the minor war is Afghanistan, both are counterinsurgency operations and not conventional wars. Troops levels in both wars are achieved by pushing the deployment schedules far beyond the standard rotation rate that allows two years of stateside duty. The schedule now allows 12 months or less stateside. During that 12 months the Army and Marines are supposed to train, refit, be with family, and to just be outside the combat zone.

My experience in Vietnam showed that the time in the battle zone had more effect on morale and force retention than did the severity of combat. Soldiers can take a lot stress if they know there will be periodic relief or they know the war has a foreseeable end. Repeated deployments sap the mind, prevent effective training, and destroy families.

Twelve months “back home” is simply not enough time to accomplish all that is required. This is an extreme hardship on the active Army and Marines, but may be even harder on the National Guard and Reserves and their communities. These units comprise about 46% of the total Army and Marine forces (it is actually nearer 52% at this time). Their combat service involves hardships similar to that of the regular Army and Marines, but they also have civilian jobs. The drawdown on the communities causes staffing problems with firefighter and police units. Jobs which are supposed to remain open while the service member is deployed mysteriously disappear.

Most of our regular Army and Marine officers and enlisted members perform their jobs with dedication and skill. They seem to have everything they need except enough troops to do the job assigned. But the strains are showing. The following three paragraphs are excepted from a July 3^rd posting on Intel Dump:

“Gen. Richard Cody, the Army vice chief of staff, was the first to sound the alarm publicly late last year. He warned that soldiers need more than 12 months between deployments so that they can complete a full range of combat training.”

And earlier this year, Maj. Gen. Robert Williams, the commander of the Army Armor Center said, “I am concerned, …based on reports from the field as well as observations of training units, that the long war is taking a toll on our core competencies."

That post generated a lot of comments. One commenter, obviously someone with recent or current duty in Iraq, said, “These officers will be assuming Company/Troop/Battery command in the next 18-24 months and have not had the benefit of maneuvering their core assets at the platoon level, let alone as a company.” He also noted, “I've seen dozens of great NCOs (non-commissioned officers) that are retiring at 20 or 21 years. … I know many of these E-7s and E-8s would have stayed for 25 or 30 years. Now, they're out at 20. My old BDE (brigade), 2/10 MTN (2^nd Brigade, 10^th Mountain Division), has hemorrhaged NCO talent at the 20 year mark. I suspect the situation is similar elsewhere.” (Items in parentheses are my explanations.)

We also hear periodic news about the Army reducing its enlistment requirements to meet recruitment goals (which are apparently still not being met). No one should doubt that the effectiveness of our military hinges on skilled service members. We’ve developed a new kind of military force that can strike hard, precisely, and quickly, and with few casualties. This requires highly intelligent, highly trained, and dedicated members. There is no room for any but the very best of people.

Counterinsurgency operations are at least equally as complex as conventional war, but it is a whole new set of requirements laid on top of existing war fighting requirements. It is asking a lot to attempt to convert our troops to fight two kinds of war and, now, to ask them to train for both in the 12 months stateside. It is No one should expect the same level of performance when new inductees are of a lower caliber. This will be especially true for counterinsurgency operations which require more individual exposure to danger as well as a higher sensitivity to customs and mores in the host country.

Now look at the National Guard. Late in 2006 and before the surge, the President of the National Guard Association, General Koper, USAF (Ret.) said, "It goes without question that Guard brigade combat teams are going to have to deploy again to theater in less time than the . . . model originally called for.” (He was referring to the rotation goal of 2 years stateside versus the current 12 months.)

Also late in 2006, Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, commander of the Army National Guard said, "What we're working out of right now is a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our force to death… If we continue to piecemeal these things like Swiss cheese, we will not find ourselves able to build complete forces back." In that same testimony before a Senate committee, he also said of one unit commander, “"He doesn't have a problem of old equipment. He has a problem of no equipment."

The above quotes are from a November 5, 2006 Washington Post article.

Secretary Gates said in a Senate hearing that the $22 billion for the Army National Guard over the next five years, would take Guard units up to 76% of their authorized equipment levels. The 76% level is the normal equipment levels, but one must ask what their condition will be during that five years, assuming the money is actually funded.

The shortage was highlighted in May 2007 after the Kansas tornados which devastated a small town. The Pentagon admitted that the Guard has only 56% of needed equipment (some units had as low as 35%). Among the budget shortfalls were: 18,600 Humvees, 30,100 trucks, 159 Chinook helicopters.

"Right now, there's nothing in the budget to do this, there's no plan to resupply them, and this is creating a real concern among governors around the states," Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) said.

The Army and Marines are not yet broken, but both services are in severe trouble that will take years to correct. The Iraq War is at the heart of the problem and the longer we stay, the greater will be the damage to ground combat services. Meanwhile, we still face a War on Terror, many failed states, a shaky Pakistan, and a boiling Middle East, any one of which could require U.S. action.

I have been opposed to a rapid exit from Iraq, but I now see no other option. We can’t win on any meaningful terms with the inadequate troop levels we have. The Iraqi government has made no progress toward a legitimate government. To stay means only more deaths of troops and civilians, further strengthening of jihadist and religious/ethnic insurgencies, and increased anger at the U.S. throughout the area.

I also understand the impact that such a withdrawal would have on the military. I have spent much of my life, as a career military officer, believing that our country and our military does not give up. I still believe that, but in this case we’ve worked our way into an losing situation and we should withdraw and rebuild for the bigger war that just around the corner.

Small Wars Journal and Operations in Iraq

Since writing my first two posts I found a great web site called Small Wars Journal. This site is operated by John Nagl and others who were involved in the development of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency and has many articles on COIN.

A recent post “Understanding Current Operations in Iraq” by Dave Kilcullen gives a very good summary on the purpose of the current operations around Baghdad and Baquaba. It generated many comments, some of which are, as I feared – by persons who had not taken the time to understand insurgencies or COIN operations.

I believe that FM 3-24 does provide a good understanding of insurgencies, their histories, and the phases that different kinds of insurgencies go through. I haven’t yet read the sections dealing with COIN so I cannot comment on the that part. I do believe, however, that the current COIN operations and the troop surge is doomed to failure and I posted a comment to that effect. The general in command of the operations said recently that 80% of the insurgents had escaped before the operations began.

Kilcullen excused the escape as, “The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why claims that “80% of AQ leadership have fled” don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather to drive them off the population and keep them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return.”

With only 5 brigades covering all of Iraq outside the area of these COIN operations and with a plan to leave Iraq after the government and Iraqi army stand up, the escape of nearly all insurgents in one area is indicative of failure. As I understand COIN operations, protecting the citizens means that you must protect all citizens who might harbor terrorists or insurgents. And FM 3-24 is very clear that it will takes years to find and neutralize the terrorists and insurgents.

It is possible that the area around Baghdad might be safer (and the reduced civilian death rate seems to bear that out) and that the government might finish the business of forming a government (and that too might be happening with yesterday’s announcement of an agreement on oil sharing). But al Qaeda is still in Iraq, the Mahdi army still exists, even if temporarily silent, and the Sunni/Shia differences remain raw.

The American mood is decidedly against keeping our troops in Iraq much longer, must less approving further buildups. Anyway, our Army and Marines, the Reserves, and National Guard are stretched beyond reasonable limits (Colin Powell says, “broken.”)

Al Qaeda can renew their operations in many Sunni dominated areas, but they’ve been most effective in urban settings so I expect them to pop up in places like the once hotly contested Mosul where one U.S. brigade now covers a large area. Al Sadr remains in charge of perhaps the largest and most organized insurgent force, the Mahdi Army. Al Sadr also remains convinced he should play a critical roll in or even lead a new Iraq.

My fear is that the coming failure will be seen as a failure of the ideas in FM 3-24 and interest in organizing for effective COIN operations will dwindle. If so, we will continue to make the mistakes of Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq. We will also lose in Afghanistan.

I may be negative on the success of the current operations, but I do see some benefit. If the Bush Administration is planning to show military success leading to an agreed upon Iraqi government (no matter how temporary), claim victory and pull out, then the current operations will have served this Administration’s purpose. Blame for eventual failure will fall on the Iraqis.

If that is the case, then the complexity of COIN operations might serve as a warning to future foreign adventures. We might start picking our battles more carefully.

The concepts distilled into FM 3-24 are important, but they also require a mindset that may not be compatible with American ideals. We want to believe that others want freedom and democracy and that America is poised to promote those ideals throughout the world. Yet COIN operations consider stability of nations above all other concerns, whether those nations are under a democratic or authoritarian government.

I think it is important that the Americans become familiar with the concepts in FM 3-24 and I intend to provide highlights of these concepts in future posts.