Surge Success Metrics

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will be reporting on the Surge in a few days and the pundits are already deciding what that report will say. In the next few paragraphs I’ll present some factors that I think need to be considered. Since the Surge aims to improve civilian security (at least in a limited area), I will later present some metrics on civilian security. A prime purpose of the Surge was to promote a political solution, but I don’t have much to say about that since it should be obvious to everyone that there is no progress in Iraqi political area.

Considering the Surge

The Surge began in January but did not reach an effective level until months later, sometime between May and June. By any measure, I think that is too short a period to measure success, but Gen. Petraeus promised a report in September. I do not know whether Petraeus intended that this report to Congress to be a make-or-break event but politics has made it so. We have a Congress that may be concerned about failure in Iraq, troop losses, and they may be responding to an angry public, but we can be certain that most of them are also worried about November 2008. One the other hand we have a President who seems bent on staying a course that only he seems to understand. In the middle is a frustrated public that wants out of Iraq but not with a precipitous withdrawal. I think, most of all, we’d like some straight shooting from all these parties.

I spend a lot of time reviewing war blogs and reports on life in Iraq and I don’t find a clear picture of whether this Surge is working or not. Before showing some measurable statistics, here are some introductory paragraphs on the general situation. Much more information can be found at. Bill Roggio’s excellent site at Fourth Rail. Also, The Institute for the Study of War is also very good but usually about a month out of date since the information must be gleaned from non-DOD sources.

The Surge began operations with a purpose of removing insurgent forces from Baghdad. This had been tried before but the insurgents have always had safe havens nearby but outside of Baghdad. Training camps, bomb factories, safe havens and other logistic functions remained in close support of insurgents in Baghdad. Therefore, the 2007 counterinsurgency operations included operations both inside and outside of Baghdad. The general idea was to simultaneously return Baghdad to rule of law while disrupting and destroying those insurgent sites outside of Baghdad.

Operations around Baquaba were a major part of the plan and those operations have now expanded into a good part of Diyala Province, up the Diyala and Tigris Rivers. Operations in Falluja and Ramadi added to the successes in Anbar Province that occurred prior to the Surge. Similar operations are ongoing in a belt that surrounds Baghdad on all sides. These Surge operations have been successful, perhaps more successful than even Petraeus had planned. Our troops are capturing or killing insurgents, finding and destroying arms and bomb factories, and breaking up Iranian supply routes on a daily basis. In many areas, local citizens are taking back control of their towns and villages.

Before the Surge began our Marines changed the character of Anbar Province by working with tribal leaders in the fight against AQI. That was and is a military success. Many tribal leaders have joined the U.S. forces in fighting al Qaeda. Just how many tribal leaders are involved is not defined so I cannot say if this represents a majority or just a large fraction of Anbar. We do know that civilian deaths for that province are down. The tribal leaders have also started re-forming local governments so this can also be considered a political success.

However, we also armed these folks. Many of those Sunnis leaers who walked out of Parliament have ties to Anbar tribes. So it is possible they walked out, not because they feared Shia control (no change here), but because they now felt less dependent on forming a possible central government. The same arming of Sunnis is being repeated in Diyala Province. The killed or captured insurgents are still predominantly Sunni and in numbers far outweighing any possible al Qaeda connection.

What was once a series of low-scale bloodshed between rival Shia factions, mostly in the south, has spilled into the headlines with the Brits losing ground in al Basra and chaos in Karbala. As the Shias fight in the streets, should we expect the Shia Members of Parliament to shake hands and get back to negotiations on oil revenue? That would be, perhaps, too Western. We deal with an Arab honor system which holds that the most honor is gained by taking it away from the opposition. And why negotiate in Parliament over oil revenues when you can take the oil fields and the revenues by force?

Al Sadr recently commanded to his Mahdi Army to cool it. Some believe this will leave the renegade militia factions (those who apparently do not march to al Sadr’s orders) exposed to our counterinsurgency operations by allowing al Sadr to distance himself from any responsibility. Maybe so, but note that much of the intra-Shia fighting is further south and not in al Sadr’s control anyway.

The recent massive bombing of the religious minority village in the north reminds me that we have almost no counterinsurgency troops in all of the north part of Iraq. With our troop commanders saying that they are pushing the insurgents out of Diyala and that they may move to the north, I expect that area to heat up soon.

Measuring Surge Success

The Surge is working. I’m just not sure how much. The picture is one of al Qaeda on the run, breaking up Shia militias (and arresting police chiefs who stepped over the line), giving control of villages and Baghdad areas back to the locals, capturing weapons and ammo and IED parts, and interdicting supply routes from Iran. Actual numbers of weapons and ammo found and villages returned to the local citizens are named. It all seems very definitive at first glance. But I have problems with numbers that are not presented in some context that I understand. If ‘X’ numbers of villages are saved, is ‘X’ a significant number of all the villages in the area of operations? Of all the arms and ammo destroyed, is this a significant percentage of the tons we lost early in this war or is being brought in from Syria and Iran?

I started counting the number of villages, the numbers of al Qaeda killed or captured, of the many weapons and ammo found in 2007 but I quit after I discovered that the total numbers would fall short of any meaningful or known quantity – not that we actually know how many al Qaeda operatives are in Iraq or how many weapons are not accounted for. Although the numbers quoted seem impressive, I could not get my hands around any percentage of the total problems.

I can’t argue with success claimed by Generals Petraeus or Odierno. I agree that their success far exceeds anything that has gone before and by a large magnitude. Given a few more years I would predict a “win.” Or, had we started with General Petraeus’ plan in 2003, we would probably be winning now. But we didn’t.

There are some indicators that I watch even though they are usually reported by the “liberal” media. But I try to extract what seem to be the facts and hopefully leave the “liberal” analysis to others.

The IraqSlogger, which sadly is going to a premium service of about $60/month by the time you read this, reported the following data from the IWPR (Institute for War and Peace Reporting) concerning how much rule of law now exists in Iraq:

• In July, at least 1,759 Iraqis were reported killed, a more than seven per cent increase over the 1,640 who are said to have died in June, according to estimates by the Associated Press.
• One out of three Iraqis is in need of emergency aid, according to a recent report by Oxfam.

The increase of July over June deaths is only 7% and may be within normal reporting error. It does however indicate that security is not improving significantly. One-third of Iraqis in need of emergency aid is a quality of life measure and paints a grim picture.

Juan Cole, who is definitely a liberal, found the following:

• Deaths per day from political violence in 2007: 62
  Deaths per day from political violence in 2006: 33

Baghdad has gone from representing 76 percent of all civilian and police war-related deaths in Iraq in January to 52 percent in July, bringing it back to the same spot it was roughly a year ago.

• Nearly 1,000 more people have been killed in violence across Iraq in the first eight months of this year than in all of 2006. So far this year, about 14,800 people have died in war-related attacks and sectarian murders. The AP accounted for 13,811 deaths in 2006.

the number of detainees held by the US military in Iraq has risen from 19,000 to 24,400 in the course of the surge. Of these over 24,000, 85% are Sunni Arabs (20,740 of the current total). These numbers make absurd the comments of some US officers that the Shiite militias are as big a threat as the Sunni Salafi 'insurgents,' or that Iran is the major trouble maker in Iraq. (I don’t necessarily agree with his conclusions but the figures, if correct, are interesting).

The reduced percentage of deaths in Baghdad indicates the Surge is working in the areas of Surge operations. The fact that this only brings us back to the levels of one year ago is not that significant since that reflects a period when our forces were standing down (reduced footprint concept) and allowing the insurgents to consolidate. That 85% of captured insurgents are Sunnis is very telling, but stating that the Shiite militias or Iran are not big problems is misleading. Iran has supported both sides in Afghanistan and we can expect them to support both Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq – covering their bet much as we’ve done in recently by promising more arms to both Arabs and Israelis. Shiite militias are very active in killing and torturing other Iraqis. They are not yet widely attacking U.S. forces and thus are not captured as often as Sunnis. The deaths per day shows an increase of about 87% over 2006 and that does indicate that the security over much of Iraq has deteriorated.

I should note that the reported figures for deaths and related metrics come from many different sources and they rarely agree in specific numbers. They do, however, generally agree in trends.

On August 29, the Toronto Star reported:

According to a recent UN report, there are 1.8 million internally displaced persons and 2 million refugees in neighbouring countries, with an additional 40,000 to 50,000 leaving per month; 54 per cent of the population lives below the extreme poverty line of $1 a day; 43 per cent of children under the age of 5 suffer from malnutrition; inflation is 70 per cent, and in 2006 there were 34,452 recorded civilian deaths and 36,685 recorded civilian injuries.

In the above UN report, the total numbers indicate nothing about any Surge successes or failures, but the apparently recent figure or 40,000 to 50,000 leaving per month does indicate that a significant number of civilians don’t feel very secure. The high poverty level, along with the attendant malnutrition, is indicative of the high unemployment rate caused by disbanding the Iraqi Army early in this war and by continued violence and lack of security. When security is low, commerce suffers and unemployment rises.

The increase in civilian deaths from 34,452 in 2006 to 36,685 speaks for itself. The deaths reported by the UN are much higher than reported by the AP (the Juan Cole source), but both speak to an increase in 2007. DOD sources report less violence and deaths which apparently conflicts with the civilian reports. I think both are correct but DOD sources are probably referring to better conditions in the provinces where the Army and Marines are conducting operations. I now count 16 U.S. brigades in those areas, leaving only 4 brigades to cover the major part of the Iraqi population. The Kansas City Star, in an August 25 report on the same AP data added the following information:

• Nearly 1,000 more people have been killed in violence across Iraq in the first eight months of this year than in all of 2006. So far this year, about 14,800 people have died in war-related attacks and sectarian murders. The AP accounted for 13,811 deaths in 2006.

In July, the AP figures show, 35 percent of all war-related killings occurred in northern provinces. The figure one year ago was 22 percent.

The last figure validates my earlier stated fear of increased violence in the northern, non-Kurdish, provinces. The FourthRail’s Brigade Order of Battle for 31 July shows that only four brigades (plus one Korean brigade) north of the Anbar/Diyala line. The order of battle map shows nine Iraqi Army brigades and seven Static Police brigades in the same area. We know that the size of the Iraqi Army and National Police brigades are slowly increasing in numbers but their reliability depends on who in the Army or Marines you talk to. My impression is that, in general, they are useful if backed by U.S. forces, and sometimes reliable on their own. But our troops do not generally trust the Iraqi troops without onsite U.S. guidance.

Of course some of these increases in civilian deaths, displaced and refugee persons, and other metrics may be concentrated in the early part of 2007, before the Surge was staffed and fully effective. But I would have hoped Petraeus planned to show measurable improvements by the time of his September report. If there are any measurable improvements, they are not popping out in the few days left.

I am not saying that the Surge is not working. I am saying that the Surge is not showing evidence of success. The metrics of civilian security indicate some improvement in the band around and in Baghdad but certainly not for the greater part of the Iraqi population. The prime purpose of the Surge is to create an environment for the Iraqi government to proceed on a political solution. I think that environment in and around Baghdad is vastly improved over 2006. The political solution is, however, stuck in 2006. Security for the majority of Iraqis ranges from no change to worse than in 2006.

Even if the Surge is improving Iraqi lives only in the areas of counterinsurgency operations, this may be enough to continue the operations. Some breakthrough on the political side seems to be essential before the coming September report. Perhaps the breakthrough might come from al Sadr if he extends his direction to his Mahdi Army elements to not attack peaceful Sunni elements. Either way the actions of Congress and the White House should be interesting.

The Surge is Working or Not ?

The Surge seems to be working if only in a very limited geographical area of Baghdad and along the Dyala River in Baquaba and to the north. The status of Anbar Province remains hopeful. Meanwhile al Basra is going very badly and al Qaeda appears to be moving north so the future of Tikrit and Mosul, with only one combat brigade or less covering the area, must be doubtful.

Still, the Surge seems to be working but a political solution is nowhere in sight. So now I have to ask the question, “If FM 3-24 calls for a troop density that calculates to about 50+ brigades for successful COIN operations, how is it that 20 brigades are doing that good?”

I think the answer lies along three lines of thought. First, none of the insurgencies that were studied as the basis of FM 3-24’s COIN theory were as religiously driven as are the Islamic jihadist movements were are now facing. Only France’s Algerian war was close and even that war was part anti-colonialist.

Second, as I’ve noted in an earlier post, while noting that insurgencies and the host nation citizenry have many factions, FM 3-24 addresses both the insurgencies and citizenry as somewhat monolithic. This is definitely not the case in Iraq. We may debate the impact that al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has on the whole situation, but there is little doubt that we do have several insurgencies currently active. The most obvious set of insurgencies are Shia against Shia, mostly in the southern oil-prize al Basra province and around the Sadrist sections of Baghdad. There are the Sunnis, with and without AQI and often against AQI, but certainly against the varied Shia militias and sometimes against the Iraqi Army and Police. All these insurgencies, except those associated with AQI, involve multiple factions in both the insurgencies and the citizenry.

My major problem with FM 3-24 has been the sheer numbers of COIN troops required by FM 3-24. It is the problem most mentioned when our leaders speak about too few troops too late in this war. But now I am thinking that FM 3-24 was wrong in this predictor. FM 3-24’s troop requirements would probably be more accurate if we had just one insurgency (albeit with many factions).

Conducting COIN operations with one insurgency requires a high number of troops. But when there are several insurgencies and they are actively fighting each other AND they have widely different goals, the required COIN troops is probably a lot less than FM 3-24 states.

FM 3-24 also assumes the people in the host nation have some common vision of the kind of desired government. The citizens will want a government that provides security and a working infrastructure that provides utilities, medical services, etc. They also want a government that can be mostly trusted to provide all this to the majority of citizens. Simply stated, the various citizen factions in Iraq do not trust the other factions to form a trusted government. My gut feeling about this division among the citizens is that it won’t necessarily affect the numbers of troops required but it should increase the time needed to unite the citizens into some kind of majority of opinion. FM 3-24 notes the ease with which terrorists can change public opinion and states that a firm majority must support the government. Fifty-one percent is not enough.

Third, the Surge aims to control only a limited amount of real estate. So far that includes only Baghdad and surrounding areas. FM 3-24 speaks to host nations, not parts of host nations. Therefore, the Surge cannot prove or disprove the validity of FM 3-24 so long as its objectives are limited to a portion of Iraq.

Our military will probably learn a lot from Iraq about counterinsurgency operations and FM 3-24 will undoubtedly be revised accordingly. Counterinsurgency operations theory is still new to the Army and Marines and some learning period is inevitable. FM 3-24 will need to be updated to account for countries like Iraq since there are more of those in the Middle East and Africa. But Iraq is not the laboratory that will prove or disprove the validity our new COIN operations theory.

As it now stands, COIN operations in Iraq are failing for reasons that have nothing to do with day-to-day COIN operations but everything to do with COIN objectives. And those reasons are the political ones. COIN operations aim to stabilize a host nation’s government and that is a political goal. Although COIN operations can provide an environment that might promote a political solution, they have limited power to create that political solution.

FM 3-24 assumes that a political solution is possible, otherwise why would we commit our lives and money to an impossible goal, unless by miscalculation. The political solution is proving impossible in Iraq. Perhaps it is time to move the Iraqi government toward a soft partition. Two issues seem to be the big stumbling blocks – oil revenue sharing and trust in the Iraqi military and police. The soft partition retains the oil revenue problem but would change the discussion on trust in the military and police. Solving one of the major stumbling blocks might help that government find a solution to oil revenue sharing.

But without a political solution, our counterinsurgency operations will be a failure because they have not accomplished their prime purpose.

Random Thoughts

In my 24 July post, I said that we should wait for Gen. Petraeus’ September report and that, ”I guess that he will be honest in that report but he might also sugar-coat his report in the interest of the Commander-in-Chief.”

Check out this report, “Majority of Americans Expect Petraeus to Spin,” on a CNN poll and reported on IraqSlogger.

Though 47% of Americans may like Petraeus, a majority does not trust he will be forthright in his assessment to Congress next month. Fifty-three percent expect him to try to make things sound better than they actually are, according to a new poll released Thursday.

CNN Polling Director Keating Holland said he doesn't think the mistrust is directed at Petreaus as much as it is what he represents.

My own comment about sugar-coating came from my military experience that simply says one should defer to the wishes of your commander, in this case the Commander-in-Chief. The CNN polling director thinks the spin factor is based on mistrust of this Administration. There’s a subtle but important difference here, but it all comes down to the same thing – we’ve all formed our opinions before Petraeus informs us.

In that light, the poll “also reports that 72% of Americans say the September assessment will not have any impact on their opinion on the war, no matter what Petraeus says.” And that reminds me of a study I read about a few months ago that says that some 85% (or some other very high percentage) of Americans will not change their opinions even when presented with opposing facts, or words to that effect. We are addicted to debate and opinions and the Internet is fueling the addiction, but we are rarely affected by those debates, except maybe to get angrier. We listen but we don’t hear.

Yet I do believe that we change our opinions in the longer term. The great majority of the American public was behind this Iraq War until sometime in 2005 when repeated untruths and errors from the White House and Defense exceeded the public’s tolerance. That great majority is now very much against this war.

And I don’t believe the media is at fault. In fact, the common cry of media bias is tiresome at best. While I do believe most folks in the media are liberal, I don’t think the product is significantly liberal, except possibly ABC which has had frequent episodes of managing the news much like Fox News does all the time. No, this time the problem has been an arrogance of power that convinced this Administration that they could fool most of the people most of the time.

As long as I’m on this media kick, check out some really dumb reporting that Black Five found. This Iraqi woman found bullets that our troops used on her house. The problem is that the bullets are full rounds with casings intact. As Black Five notes, we must be throwing bullets now. Read the whole thing to find out this is not her first miraculous bullet find. Why the AFP (and the F stands for Financial) reported this can only be explained by unabashed dumbness.

Speaking of dumbness, you may be surprised that this also pops up in the White House. Check out Cheney’s 1994 explanation video of why we shouldn’t invade Iraq. It’s about the best summary of our current quagmire that’s ever come out of the White House. I’ve watched this video three times, trying to determine if it is a hoax. I certainly looks like it ought to be a hoax, but I guess it’s real.

Grim at the Black Five blog posted parts of a roundtable with Brigadier General Bergner (Army spokesman in Iraq) on August 9. Bergner was speaking about successes on the local level and Grim asked, “Do you think that the nature of Iraqi society is changing in this regard, that it's becoming more of a bottom-up society, a locally driven society?”

Bergner replied, “You know, that's a very good question, it's an interesting one, because on one level, it has been a centrally governed country, without question, but in this country the tribe, the family have always been the most powerful bond that the Iraqi people have felt. And so you have kind of a duality of centrally directed but, if you ask the people who they trust and who they want to work with, it's at the family, tribal and community level.”

The gist of all this seems to be some hope that the Iraqis will form a nation from the bottom up. Tribes will work together and form provincial governments. Blocks of Sunnis will learn they can work with blocks of Shias. The Kurds can work with anybody. Finally, all these groups will from a working Iraqi government.

Well, the very first step is certainly happening. Tribes in Anbar are joining to fight al Qaeda with the Americans. Kurds already have the semblance of an autonomous government. Shias of the Sadrist type provide security and run services within their enclaves. But doesn’t all this just bring them back to WWI times when the Ottoman Empire collapsed and internal warring followed? Britain tried to unify the country and had about as much success then as they are having in al Basra today.

The Yugoslavian experience is a recent example of what happens when a strongman is removed and a country united only by force and terror falls apart and proceeds directly to genocide. If one want other recent examples then check out the Sudan, Somalia, and other countries in that region. In those cases, the solution (maybe temporary) was partition. I’m still in favor of a soft partition in Iraq. A hard partition is where Iraq becomes three states. A soft partition is where three, mostly autonomous, regions join in a loose federation of economic interests (oil, mostly).

Ethnic maps show fairly well-defined regions of religious identity and tribal groups. Division along those lines is possible although any drawing of borders would lead to widespread relocations. But a huge part of the Iraqi population is already in refuge camps in Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and Jordan. The problem with even the soft partition is central Iraq, around Baghdad, where Shia and Sunni live together. If a soft partition seems workable then perhaps we should entertain the idea of U.S. troops remaining in that area and continue to do what they are now doing – separating the warring factions. We could call it the District of Baghdad or Baghdad, D.C.

I still intend to post on problems with the FM 3-24 counterinsurgency theory. I’d planned one more topic concerning the fine line between counterinsurgency operations and propping up unsavory governments. But as I prepare that post, other problems keep intruding. The sheer numbers of troops required may prevent our even considering future COIN operations. Also, I keep looking at the experience that FM 3-24 is based on and I don’t find a lot previous insurgencies that are like the religion-driven movements we are most likely to encounter. I need more think time.

Problems with the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Theory, 2

Duration of Counterinsurgency Operations: FM 3-24, page 43, states: “Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment. Insurgencies are protracted by nature.” Other references speak of counterinsurgency operations as typically lasting many years to decades. Our country has never fought a war of any type for more than a few years, even when our survival was at stake. Yet, this aspect of counterinsurgency operations should be primary before committing to future operations.

This is a good place to note that this problem and other problems that I see have more to do with our ability support and sustain such operations rather than with counterinsurgency operations theory itself.

Intelligence and language skills: Military intelligence and language skills are linked and essential. FM 3-24, page 79 says, “Counterinsurgency (COIN) is an intelligence-driven endeavor.” FM 3-24, Chapter Three, on intelligence, says nothing about the role of language in intelligence. Language support is relegated to Appendix C which introduces categories of linguists and provides methods of training and using mostly locally hired linguists.

The Iraq Study Group noted, “All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans’ lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of fluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficient communication with Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage. There are still far too few Arab language–proficient military and civilian officers in Iraq, to the detriment of the U.S. mission.”

Colleges and universities do not provide the needed skills since most of these institutions continue to concentrate on the European languages. The Army News Service reported in May of this year:

• (DLI) "We have basically doubled the size of our faculty, staff and student load, while our budget has tripled," said Warren Hoy, chief of mission support for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. DLIFLC's budget was $77 million in 2001, while fiscal 2006's budget was $197 million.
• DLIFLC today has more than 1,500 professional language instructors and is expecting to hire another several hundred teachers in 2007. The student load has grown since 2001 and is now more than 3,500 at any given time. Linguists come from all four branches of the military, the U.S. Coast Guard and other DOD agencies, Hanagan said.
• The institute graduates more than 2,000 students per year and has degree-granting authority, whereby qualified students can receive associate degrees in foreign language.

The Army’s Careers and Jobs page advertises for Linguist/Interpreters in the following languages:

Arabic-Modern Standard

• Arabic-Gulf-Iraqi
• Arabic-Egyptian
• Arabic-Jordanian
• Arabic-Syrian
• Arabic-Lebanese
• Arabic-Yemeni
• Arabic-Sudanese
• Arabic-Maghrebi
• Arabic-Algerian
• Arabic-Libyan
• Arabic-Moroccan
• Arabic-Tunisian
• Pushtu/Pashto/Pachto
• Pushtu-Afghan
• Kurdish
• Kurdish-Behdini (Kurmanji)
• Kurdish-Sorani
• Persian-Afghan (Dari)
• Persian-Iranian (Farsi)

Note that the Iraq Study report blasted both civilian and the military linguistic deficits. The military is correcting that situation, but I’ve found nothing regarding our State Department correcting it.

Unity of Effort: This is a catch-all topic wherein the Army/Marines hope to provide some framework for managing all the military and civilian, U.S. and host nation, NGOs and IGOs, and all the other world organizations that might become involved in counterinsurgency. FM 3-24 also notes that even coordinating all these groups is problematic. But the importance of this Unity of Effort is foretold by its being the very first chapter after the introduction chapter.

Our military has little experience with such coordination, although there are other field manuals and joint procedures that deal with the issue. Relating to one successful effort, FM 3-24 provides a short summary of a conversation between Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC, and the JCS Chairman on the Kurdish relief operations in 1991. The Chairman asked Zinni about the nature of the lines of command in Zinni’s organization chart that included the civilian relief organizations. Zinni’s reply was, “Hand Shake that’s it. No memoranda of agreement. No memoranda of understanding….”

This was a relief mission in the Kurdish areas. For more detail on Zinni’s view of Unity of Effort see his autobiography Battle Ready; Zinni, Tom Clancy, and Tony Koltz; G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 2004. It’s also a good read.

COIN operations moves command and control down to its lowest possible level with more decisions made at the lower unit level. Even so the military organization must still, by necessity, maintain a relatively tight chain of command that is mostly incompatible with civilian organizations. Perhaps more importantly, the military and civilian organizations have different goals that require different approaches in dealing with the citizens of the host nation. Civilian organizations often need to maintain a perception, by the locals, of being independent from military operations. This allows them to gain trust. I think it is possible that a successful military COIN operation could also instill that trust in the locals and thus make reduce the need for civilian organization to appear independent.

There is no question that even COIN operations are conducted in a physically dangerous environment – probably more dangerous than conventional operations. Civilian organizations are understandably reluctant to send their people into such danger. In those cases, the military may have to assume some or all of the civilian functions of reconstituting infrastructure and providing humanitarian assistance.

I hope I’ve given some flavor to the complexity of and, as I see it, the difficulty of actually achieving Unity of Effort. When Unity of Effort is not successful, the military must assume roles that are beyond the traditional military roles. We’ve support relief operations in such places as Somalia but our troops’ role was mostly one of security for food transportation and distribution. In Iraq, our troops have been doing everything from reconstruction to medical care to repairing infrastructure. Iraq also serves as an example of the failure of Unity of Effort, at least until late in 2006. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which in theory was responsible for coordination the civilian efforts in Iraq, is now infamous for its shear incompetence and was finally dissolved. There was almost no coordination between the CPA and CENTCOM or the Commander Multi-National Force.

While I see hope in the Army/Marines improving their language skills, I don’t see a lot of near-term hope in Unity of Effort. The military and the civilians will have to learn to trust and work with each other when our experience is usually the opposite. It will take time and experience.

Problems with the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Theory

I've watched the good news coming from Anbar and Dyala provinces and I'm just not convinced the picture is all that rosy. Much of what I read are war blogs by soldiers and Marines. Most are upbeat and I see a change in attitude that goes something like, “Finally we have a good military plan and the right top brass and the tide is turning.” Reports by the media also indicate that things are indeed going better around Baghdad, Baquaba, and parts of Dyala and Anbar Provinces. But I hear nothing about the rest of Iraq.

The new Army/Marine field manual, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, seems to be on the right track and a definite improvement over our failed counterinsurgency practices in the past. But I have some serious problems with the requirements that FM 3-24 places on the American people who, in the end, must support these operations. I also have some problems with the military’s ability to develop the language skills required in these intelligence intensive operations.

Number of Troops: I started these posts with an analysis that, according to the troop density requirements specified in FM 3-24, page 23*, we need about 50+ brigades in Iraq. The surge gives us only 20 brigades. Somewhere in my analysis I noted that I assumed a full combat brigade of 9,500 troops. The 9,500 number was taken from a recent Army Times article. It seems there are now 165,000 troops in Iraq. If all those troops are in combat brigades then a typical brigade would be 8,062. If so FM 3-24 would call for about 58 brigades and we still only have 20 brigades. Further, not all those 165,000 are in combat brigades, so the counterinsurgency requirement is even higher. Also, my calculations used the lower figure of 20 troops per 1000 residents, so the requirement may be even higher.

(* I quote from the manual: ”Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.” Underline is mine.)

Fifteen brigades are involved in operations around Baquaba and Baghdad (true in July, but may be somewhat different at this time) and that leaves only 5 brigades to cover the rest of Iraq. I hope that the current operations give enough breathing space to allow the Maliki government to reach some settlement that would not force our precipitate and complete withdrawal. We do have some options short of a complete withdrawal; they are attractive only in comparison to complete withdrawal; and we need some political solution prior to implementing any one of them.

Let me expand on the number of troops that might be required in future counterinsurgency operations. In Counterinsurgency 104, I introduced the Failed States Index. Here is a table for the top dozen Failed States that shows the approximate population (from the CIA World Factbook) and the number of counterinsurgency troops needed per FM 3-24.

State	Population (rounded to nearest million)		COIN Troops (20 troops per 1000 population)	COIN Brigades (9,500 per brigade)
Sudan	39		780,000	82
Iraq	27		540,000	58
Somalia	9		180,000	19
Zimbabwe	12		240,000	25
Chad	10		200,000	21
Cote D’Ivoire	18		360,000	38
Dem. Rep. of Congo	68		1,360,000	143
Afghanistan	32		640,000	67
Guinea	10		200,000	21
Cent. African Republic	4		80,000	8
Haiti		9	180,000	19
Pakistan		168	3,360,000	354

In theory, our current maximum of 20 brigades would allow us to do some counterinsurgency in only five of the top twelve (Somalia, Chad, Guinea, Central African Republic, and Haiti). Note that we could not simultaneously operate in more than one these countries and we could not also have a conventional war going on at the same time.

I also note that the last Haitian stabilization effort, mostly an international effort, had a troop density of only about 4 or 5 troops to 1,000 citizens. Since that effort was successful, perhaps I should look at that in further depth in a later post.

With all the hype about the Surge, one would think we’ve maxed out on the number of troops our all-volunteer force can attract. However, we fielded a larger Army and Marine force in 1990 per the April 30 latimes.com “Warriors at the Limit” article. The Army force was 750,000 and the Marines were at 197,000 for a total of 947,000. Today, the Army is about 507,000 and the Marines 180,000 for a total of 687,000. If we were to increase our military to this force size, that’s a 38% increase.

Since we’ve done it before, we can assume the U.S. has the capability to field a military force equal to the 1990 level. That would field roughly 27 ½ combat brigades, in addition to other current stateside and foreign deployments. At that level, we could operate in only one additional Failed State of the top dozen. We could also operate simultaneously in Somalia and the Central African Republic. Not a very promising outlook.

A draft seems out of the question and I don’t think the draft is compatible with our Full Spectrum force concept. Such a concept demands the brightest and most dedicated volunteers. A draft cannot promise to fill these requirements. Could we increase our all-volunteer force above the 1990 levels? I think we can but that would be another budget increase to account for the increased troops and for the additional incentives that will be required. It would also mean actually funding current equipment shortfalls plus the additional equipment for the larger force.

This just in: . 'War Czar' Cites Concern for Stress of War on Troops. Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan, otherwise known as the War Czar, said, “And I am concerned that those men and women and the families they represent are under stress as a result of repeated deployments…. There's both a personal dimension of this, where this kind of stress plays out across dinner tables and in living room conversations within these families, and ultimately, the health of the all-volunteer force is going to rest on those sorts of personal family decisions.” And in response to a question on reconstituting the draft, “I think it makes sense to certainly consider it, and I can tell you, this has always been an option on the table, but ultimately, this is a policy matter between meeting the demands for the nation's security by one means or another. Today, the current means of the all-volunteer force is serving us exceptionally well. It would be a major policy shift — not actually a military, but a political policy shift to move to some other course.”

I’ve previously voiced the same concerns on the stress. I agree with him on the draft in that it is a political decision. Our local chapter of the Military Officers Association of America has discussed bringing back the draft. We don’t often agree on much, including the Iraq War, but we do agree on the draft. The draft would be good for the country because we need more voters who actually understand what it means to serve the nation. Most especially we need civilian leaders who understand what it means to send troops into danger. However, the draft would probably lower the overall competence of our defense force.

All of this analysis has used approximate data and the results are certainly not precise. My interest was to develop ballpark estimates. However, I think most will agree that my bare minimum of 50 combat brigades is calculated directly from the minimum requirement in FM 3-24 and that the Surge, which we cannot maintain much longer, falls at only 40% of the minimum need.

I intend to continue this line of questioning counterinsurgency operations as envisioned by our military in my next posts. My planned topics are Duration of Counterinsurgency Operations, Unity of Effort (coordinating military and civilian sectors), Intelligence and Language Skills, Stability Operations or Nation Building?, and Other Options to COIN Operations.

Counterinsurgency 104, More on Full Spectrum War

In Counterinsurgency 103 I ended that post with a reference to the broad range of new requirements that today’s war fighting places on the full spectrum warrior. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, describes full spectrum war as including offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It also notes that counterinsurgency operations are mostly stability oriented but also include the other two areas of war fighting.

And the manual notes that stability operations are not peacekeeping operations which have the goal of minimizing violence. I think that is a good point to remember or we might confuse the two since the media seems unable to distinguish the two requirements. FM 3-24 gives a good example of Baghdad in 2003. At that time, Sadr City, the source of most of the Shia-driven violence around Baghdad, was fairly quiet. However, in this case the quiet was not the result of peacekeeping operations. The insurgents were preparing for high-tempo violence to follow.

Where, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, might we be fighting these wars? FM 3-24 discusses indicators of legitimacy of a government (in the eyes of its citizens). Six indicators are listed (underlines are mine):

• The ability to provide security for the populace
• Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace
• A high level of popular participation in or support for political processes
• A culturally acceptable level of corruption
• A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development
• A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions

Simply put, if a government scores high on all these factors then it will probably enjoy the support of its people. I note that none of these indicators mention American ideals, in fact they leave lots of room for practices that we might find offensive. The key phrases are “culturally acceptable,’ ‘popular participation,” and “substantial majority” of the citizens of that nation or state.

FM 3-24 does not discuss candidate states and it should not. However, for those interested in states where we might become involved I point you to the Failed States Index, produced by the Fund for Peace and used by our Department of State and published annually in the Foreign Policy magazine. The indicators that go into a failed state are:

Social Indicators
I-1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
I-2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating
Complex Humanitarian Emergencies
I-3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia
I-4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

Economic Indicators
I-5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines
I-6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

Political Indicators
I-7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
I-8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
I-9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread
Violation of Human Rights
I-10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"
I-11. Rise of Factionalized Elites
I-12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

These indicators are remarkably similar to FM 3-24’s indicators of legitimacy. They differ only in that the Failed States indicators are somewhat more specific. In my own words, a failed state is one where the government is either not functioning (pick any Horn of Africa country) or is widely opposed by its citizens (Algeria under French control) to the extent that an insurgency is either ongoing or likely to begin. The index simply draws a line at a score of 90 with any country scoring over 90 higher considered critical. Those states in the top category were once called “Failed States.” Today they are referred to as critical states. The next lower category with scores 60 to 90 are danger states, once called “Failing States.”

Note that Iraq is number 2 after Sudan. Afghanistan comes in at number 8. Pakistan, probably the most scary nation with pro-jihadist nuclear scientists and a growing jihadist movement including the Taliban and al Qaeda, is another danger state at number 12. These are our friends. While African states are well represented in the danger and critical categories, there are also several states with large Islamic populations.

Pakistan makes an interesting example of possible counterinsurgency action, especially since recent crackdowns on extremist have made the country less stable. In the beginning of my posts I noted that FM 3-24 makes an overall estimate of troops required for counterinsurgency as 20 troops for each 1,000 in the population. For Iraq that comes to about 50 combat brigades. The surge expanded the 15 brigades to 20, less than half to the Army/Marines’ stated need. Iraq had a population of about 27.5 million (less now due to the mass exodus of the middle class). Pakistan has a population of about 164.7 million or about 6 times the size of Iraq. This essentially says that we have no counterinsurgency solutions for any problems in Pakistan. Even if we were to increase the size of our military to its maximum size before 9/11, we would still be unable to do anything.

This ends the Counterinsurgency 10X series. I’ve covered about all of FM 3-24’s overview of counterinsurgency. Subsequent chapters deal with specifics. I might discuss some of the remainder of FM 3-24, but not as part of a series.