And Now for Something Completely Different

It’s been only six days since I last posted, but it seems like a month to me. I think I was pretty plain in my disappointment over the whole Petraeus Report thing. I know I shouldn’t have been disappointed since I predicted most of the non-consequences. Still, I was disappointed and its been hard to start writing again.

At the same time, I have to wonder why I am even doing this blog. After close to 90 typed pages worth of postings and untold hours in trying to make my ramblings appear coherent and having only one comment in all that time, I have to wonder. I know there are quite a few folks who read the blog (Google and Feedster tracking). I even have a few subscribers, but no comments.

When I started thinking about a blog, I saw a couple of lists of things a good blog should contain. Among the ten or twelve points was, “pick a viewpoint and be passionate about it.” If that means that I have to choose my viewpoint and then never change my mind regardless of contrary facts, then I’m not your man. I do change my mind when I think I am wrong and I rarely jump onto any platform with careless abandon since I’ve found my most cherished opinions too often trashed by facts. I run hot and lukewarm on the Surge even though I want it to succeed.

Here’s what I believe, in nutshell, mostly regarding the Iraq War and our current federal government:

• I support the Surge but I expect to see measurable improvements in the personal security of Iraqi citizens by March-April 2008.
• I support the troops, and have done so since I retired from the Navy in 1975, with regular and sizeable donations to the DAV, Disabled Vets for Life, and related organizations. In more recent years I’ve added organizations that support active troops and their families to my list of donations.
• I am against a complete withdrawal of troops but neither the President or Congress has any coherent idea on what role our troops should play in a reduced presence, and without a clear mission I fear it would lead to more Bush disasters.
• I voted for George Bush twice and I sincerely apologize. I’ve been a Republican for about 50 voting years. My form Republicanism is of an age when dinosaurs died. Some would call me a Goldwater Republican but an Alan Greenspan Republican might mean more to younger generations. I am fiscally conservative but socially middle of the road. I also believe in less federal government and retention of the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution. The Bush Administration meets none of that criteria.

As you can see, I am passionate about the Bush Administration. As a student of history I can say that this Administration is the most disastrous in our modern history. As America first appeared with power on the world scene, we had a reputation for moral naivety in diplomatic affairs. As we learned to participate in world events, the naivety was lost but our Christian morality remained high and we became the beacon of all that is good in man. In just six and a half years, our beacon was extinguished and we now stand as the only Western nation (except for Germany in WWII) that believes in torture, imprisonment without trial, making war on countries that pose no real threat, and we Americans allow our government to lie to us and the world on a daily basis. You may keep this in mind because it does color some of my other opinions.

All that said, I will keep posting. I intend to shift my posts to an investigation of Islam and whether we should be afraid of Islam or just jihadists. To do that, I want to take a look at why they hate the West and the U.S. in particular. I want to compare Christianity and Islam because I see too many Americans trying to understand Islam in reference to Christianity and I believe that is the wrong approach. I will occasionally return to counterinsurgency and the Iraq War whenever I see something significant. Stay tuned.

To encourage comment, I am removing the word verification step in posting comments.

Petraeus Report: The Fallout

I don’t have much to say about the aftermath of Gen. Petraeus’ report to Congress. I’ve struggled with trying to find some meaning in the series of testimony and political posturing in Congress, but I see no change in course. As for the President, again no change.

In an earlier post, I made some predictions on what the General would say and the questions Congress might ask. Except for the promise to bring home a brigade in 2007, my predictions were mostly on target. I’m no Nostradamus and I didn’t really look into the future. As for Petraeus, I predicted that he would expound on the successes of the Surge and avoid the failures in bringing security to the greater parts of Iraq and in the Iraqi government’s failure to move on a national settlement. That is truth and I believe the General is truthful.

Congress, however, is spectacularly unchanged after the very straight-forward and honest testimony of Gen. Petraeus. All in all, I would describe the past week of Iraq War briefings, Congressional comment, and a Presidential speech as a huge non-event. Nothing has changed. The public is still against the war. Congress is doing nothing. The President is “staying the course.” And our troops will continue to try to make things right in Iraq while Washington, D.C., fiddles.

Both parties are watching the polls as they prepare their cases for the coming elections. Let’s look at some of the recent polls and see if we can see how Congress will try to move.

Gallup’s Sep 7-8 poll:

• 63% think the Surge is either making no difference or making things worse in Iraq
• 60% favor some kind of withdrawal timetable; 30% oppose a timetable
• 54% think the war was a mistake
• 62% believe we cannot win the war

PollingReport.com:

• ABC poll, Sep 4-7
• Single most important issue in Nov 2008 – 35% said Iraq (unchanged in last month)
• CBS poll, Sep 4-8
• "Regardless of how you usually vote, do you think the Republican Party or the Democratic Party is more likely to make the right decisions about the war in Iraq?"
• Democrats 42%, Republicans 32%

There are many more polls but the results are remarkably consistent – most oppose the war and most want a withdrawal timetable. Most of those polled thought the President would not change his war policy regardless of what Petraeus might say. Most thought the Democrats would do a better job on the war, but here’s a neat item (from PollingReport.com on CBS/NYT poll in July):

• "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Republicans in Congress are handling the situation with Iraq?" – 65% disapprove, but
• "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Democrats in Congress are handling the situation with Iraq?" – 59% disapprove.

It’s all in how you ask the questions. Here’s my reading. Most Americans are tired of the war and want out but are frustrated by an unbending President and an incapable Congress. With most Americans unhappy with both Republicans and Democrats, I would not even try to predict how November 2008 will go at this early date.

In other polls Americans believe that our Congress is too partisan. The opening, posturing statements, before Gen. Petraeus spoke, telegraphed that inflexibility of both the Republican and Democratic positions. The continued posturing statements have only reiterated their dedication to party politics. Statesmanship and party politics are mutually exclusive in this Congress.

Gen. Petraeus’ testimony, while honest and straight-forward, was lackluster and unconvincing. He did not present a clearly defined mission, was not overly confident of success in Iraq as a whole, or even of success of his current operations. Since the Administration have never effectively explained the limited goals of the Surge, I can’t blame Petraeus for not defining those goals or successes in the limited time he was given. Without a clear definition of the Surge goals, the successes within the areas of current operations were lost in an attempt to talk about success in the whole of Iraq.

Sen. Warner asked Petraeus if our work in Iraq had made America safer. The General, after some hesitation, could not say if we were safer. In a sense, the question was unfair since neither Petraeus nor his troops are making war on al Qaeda, except for AQI whose connections with the greater al Qaeda are tenuous. Our President has repeatedly told us that the Iraq War is to make America safer and that we need to fight them there so we don’t have to fight them here. In fact, the “war on terrorism” became low priority (no priority is probably more accurate) when the planning for the Iraq invasion began. The Iraq War has never been about al Qaeda, except as one of the many justifications for the President’s actions.

Bush also ignored Gen. Petraeus’ testimony. One might note that “promised” troop reductions were the result of the General’s testimony but Bush made those statements without actually referring to Petraeus’ testimony. Why? Because Bush had done his deciderings long before the General’s testimony or even his verbal report to the President.

One might well ask me if I have a solution, since I am so down on both the White House and Congress. Well, I’ve rewritten the ending to this post three times and I have to admit that I have no better answers. We are simply bogged down in the wrong war. Bush has misled America (some might say he lied) so many times that not even many Republicans now trust him.

We know that the JCS is worried that our total defense posture is in trouble because all resources are tied down in the Iraq quagmire. Now comes Adm. Fallon, Petraeus’ commanding officer at CENTCOM who sees other pressing needs for troops in Afghanistan (remember the war on terror?), the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere.

At this time I would vote for a more rapid withdrawal of forces but I can’t define what level should remain in Iraq. I don’t see how a small U.S. presence could accomplish training or perform any useful function as Iraq heads toward a division of the state. Whether the division is accomplished by civil war or a more orderly division remains to be seen. Although Iran might be a near term winner, I don’t see them winning much in the long term. There are too many issues between Iran and Iraq. Iran remains Persian while Iraq is Arabic, a factor that is important in the Middle East but seems lost to Western thinkers. Memories of the brutal and long Iran/Iraq War are still fresh. The Iranian Islamic revolution is not popular with the majority of Muslims outside of Iran. And, Iran is in the midst of economic problems and doesn’t need the burden of a demolished Iraq.

But to give up in Iraq also means that again we have removed any meaning to the sacrifices of our troops and their families. The Powell Doctrine has fallen into disrepute as placing too many limits on the use of American troops. But the Powell Doctrine also reminds us that we should not engage in foreign adventures unless the majority of Americans are in full support, and for the entire time required. American was behind this adventure when we were told it was part of the war on terror. As that fallacy became clear, the majority of Americans no longer supported this war.

I began this post by saying I don’t have much to say about Gen. Petraeus’ testimony. As a slight correction, I don’t think I have much useful to say. It is time I moved on to other subjects.

Petraeus Report: Prediction Error

My last post, on Friday, gave some predictions for Gen. Petraeus’ report to Congress and their responses. It is too early to gauge my accuracy on Congress, but the initial pontification before the testimony was indicative that I will be mostly right about Congress when they get around to saying something. I didn’t listen to the post-pontification of Congress or the media.

I expected, but was depressed by, the opening political salvos of partisanship. I’ve said a couple of times that the people want Congress (and the White House) to find a bipartisan solution to Iraq. So much for hope.

I was dead wrong about beginning troop withdrawals this year. Petraeus is ready to return a Marine brigade to the states this year. I am not sure how to read that except an acknowledgement that Congress or voters are making their wishes felt. But it does seem to be a big concession that I am sure will impact the current operations.

He also sort of promised to start a phased drawdown to pre-Surge levels by the end of 2008, but caveated that with an admonition that each stage must be reviewed first. His first review in 2008 pretty much fits the schedule I predicted. I agree that each drawdown phase should be reviewed before committing since we can’t predict those situation at this early date, but it is going to come across as another one of those “we just need another few months” refrains from the White House. Congress will most likely jump on that one.

Which leads me to a reason for this post. The Administration has been the most secretive and non-communicative one in my 43 years as a voter. It’s even worse, far worse, than the Nixon years. This is probably the primary source of America’s frustration with this Presidency. It seems truly congenital even with the neocons mostly gone. At a time when our troops are finally making progress (maybe slow and uneven, but still progress), and at a time when our diplomatic corps in Iraq is no longer staffed with incompetent cronies but straight-talking professionals, the story is not reaching America.

The White House and DOD have botched all the good news. Gen. Petraeus did touch on the current operations but I think, unless you’ve been following the operations, it would have gone over your head. I don’t see how the General could have done better since he had to assume the political listeners had some knowledge of the operations, and it would have been difficult to overcome the months just since February while the White House and DOD botched getting the word out.

Congress and the Petraeus Report: A Prediction

Gen. Petraeus will not be reporting to Congress. It is now called an Assessment. He will not provide a written report but will brief Congress using illustrations and charts (Powerpoint?). The White House will then write the report. You may believe that the White House has already written that report, but that’s not really necessary. I think we already know what the White House will say, given a long and unchanging history of stay the course, maybe with other methods.

The White House will say the following:

• The Surge is working
• Al Qaeda is on the run (any differences between AQI and al Qaeda will be fudged and it will be implied that all insurgents are al Qaeda)
• We need to keep the Surge a little longer but some troops will start coming home in 2008 (exact date will not be given but spring will be hinted)

With that out of the way, here is what Gen. Petraeus will say:

• The Surge is working and we need to stay a little longer
• The following key measures are showing improvement:
• Civilian deaths are down and security is up in Baghdad, Anbar Province, Diyala Pronvince; and Salah ad Din Province is showing slight but measurable progress. The northern Kurd-controlled provinces remain stable and secure.
• The major cities of Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baquaba, once extremely dangerous and owned by insurgents, are now relatively peaceful.
• Local leaders are working with Coalition forces and reforming local governments.
• The Iraqi Army is slowly expanding and most units are effective to some extent, although most will require U.S. troops for guidance and fire support at least well into 2008. Our training of the Iraqi Army is making the difference. Logistics and support of the Iraqi Army remains a problem with that government incapable of providing such support and with no foreseeable improvement.
• The Iraqi National Police is a disappointment with leadership and ranks filled with Shia extremists. Citizens fear the INP.
• The central government is barely functioning and there has been no progress toward essential political goals, although 3 of 18 goals were partially met.
• Operations against Shia insurgents are just now beginning. We cannot, at this time, determine the success or failure of these operations.
• Recommendations:
• Continue on the present military course and maintain the Surge level into 2008. Reductions in troop levels can begin in January or February with one brigade. The remaining 4 Surge brigades can be sent stateside slowly beginning March-April 2008.
• A force level of 130,000 troops should remain in Iraq for at least the next 12 to 18 months with a reassessment at the end of that period
• The Iraqi Army will continue to improve and will take over security from Coalition forces. Our withdrawals should be keyed to improvements in the Iraqi Army.
• The State Department should continue pressures on Syria and Iran to stop supplying Iraqi insurgents and otherwise meddling in Iraqi matters.

Those Republicans who continue to support the President and his war (still a majority of Republicans) have little room to maneuver and will probably show support by asking Gen. Petraeus to elaborate on the positive parts of his assessment. Democrats also have little maneuvering room. They cannot again threaten to decrease funding – been there, done that, didn’t work. They will question the negative aspects of the General’s assessment and will push for a more definitive plan and schedule for the drawdown to troops.

Democrats will ask the following questions or make the following points:

• The security for most Iraqi citizens has not improved. Will there be a change?
• They will know that the current operations are “clear and hold” and that there are not enough troops to significantly extend the current operations while holding our current successes.
• Local tribal chiefs who support the Coalition are primarily Sunni and we’ve gained that support by arming them. Isn’t it likely they will turn against us in the near future? (Petraeus will probably admit to that possibility but will point out that what we have now is far better than our past whack-a-mole campaign against AQI.
• Having the Iraqi Army stand up as we stand down is important. Can we speed up that schedule? When can we transition our forces from the current operations to one of just training? (Petraeus must fudge an answer to this since it is not in the foreseeable future but he should not fully admit to that).
• The Chairman and others in the JCS, have said that we cannot sustain the Iraq troop levels beyond March-April 2008. How does that mesh with your operational plans?
• Tell us more about your relationship with the Iraqi government and specifically Maliki. What specific actions on the part of that government do you need to start bringing our troops home?
• Do you recommend we disband the Iraqi National Police? (Petraeus will probably say that that should be a decision of the Iraqi government, which it is. If pressed Petraeus might hint that we’ve already begun to promote and support local protection forces who are trusted by local citizens.)
• General, we have made no progress against the Shiite militias who are greater in number than the AQI. Muqtada al Sadr has little control over most of these groups and they are spreading terror over much of Iraq. Do you have the troops to do anything about that? What is the state of the British troops in Basra? (I think Petraeus will be basically honest on this part and admit we can do little more outside our current operational area and that the British, while pulling back, are steadfast. The General should also note that we are doing something about the Shiite militias in Baghdad.)

There may then be a Congressional push for an agreed upon troop withdrawal schedule. I think they are fully aware that most voters want some kind of bipartisan action. Whether any bipartisan effort can overcome the fringe non-compromisers is doubtful but the message will still be sent to the White House. The President will agree on a schedule for the first brigade withdrawal; he may even promise a date earlier than Congress hints at. However, the President will erect a smoke screen around further withdrawals.

Those are my predictions but, for the most part, they are just a somewhat organized repeat of what we already know. Deciding on the correct future path is no easier than it was several months ago. There is no question that Petraeus and his troops and officers have made remarkable progress that should have led to significant political action in Baghdad. It didn’t and our forces are just about near their limit of expanding operations, and well beyond their limit in the length and size of this deployment.

At first I was very negative on the Surge and I stick by my first assessment that we did not have enough troops to succeed in counterinsurgency in Iraq – that was based on specific troop requirements as stated in FM 3-24, the Army/Marines counterinsurgency manual which was developed under General Petraeus’ command and in which he actively participated. As it turns out I was off by half and my estimate of the requirement should have been more like 100 brigades than the 50+ I stated. I had used a brigade size of 9,500 men as per two strategic think tank sites. The definition of a brigade changes and so does the level but it appears a brigade in Iraq is only about 4,000.

At first I didn’t understand the scope of operations and that they were purposefully limited to controlling Baghdad by also controlling the surrounding areas, and to build on previous successes in Anbar Province. The goal was limited and directed to creating conditions for the Iraqi government to make political progress. Given those limitations, the Surge was remarkably successful in military terms. But there has been no political progress. In fact there are enough indicators that the political situation is even more deadlocked and Maliki’s government may be imploding.

Gen. Petraeus has, at least twice, expressed his dissatisfaction with the Maliki government and has just recently said that the Surge has had uneven success (letter to his troops). Those statements are significant in two respects. First, the problems with the Maliki government have come from Petraeus and, apparently not so much from Amb. Crocker. I’m not sure of the significance of this but it seems oddly reversed. Second, having Petraeus telegraph uneven success in the very few days prior to his assessment to Congress is a bad sign.

I have also stated that the success or failure of the new counterinsurgency will not be determined by this Surge since it does not cover the entire country. I hope that any perceived failure of the Surge does not reflect on the theory.

A Failure in Generalship and Congress

In late July I posted an explanation on why retired generals spoke out against the Iraq War while active generals do not (The Generals Against Still Speak). Yesterday I was led, by Intel Dump’s Phillip Carter in “Generation Gap.” to an article in the New York Times Magazine by Fred Kaplan, “Challenging the Generals.” This in turn caused me to read the Armed Forces Journal article that started the discussion, “A failure in generalship,” by Lt. Col. Yingling.

Since I disagreed with some of Col. Yingling’s suggestions to bring Congress into the picture, I reread my earlier post to see what I thought back in June/July. Here is how I actually closed that post:

“Is this silence good or bad for America? I have to side with the good option, although I do have reservations in the case of the Iraq War. It is good that our military believes in subordination to our civilian leaders. It is good that our military does not publicly support any one political party or theory.

“There is also the question of who would have listened if the generals did speak out. The Bush Administration, along with a complicit Republican Congress, was extremely effective at squelching opposition through calls to patriotism. Many of us who did try to speak out were called unpatriotic by a public that had little knowledge of the war and who remain largely ignorant today.

“I am certain that senior military officers did speak against the mismanagement of the war but not publicly. However, we all know how Rumsfeld and his neocons theorists ignored and belittled those generals. I have to believe that Bush knew and condoned this action. When Bush says that he relies on his commanders’ advice, history shows that to be a lie.”

I still believe in the points I made on the silence of active generals being mostly a good thing. I also wish some active generals had spoken out against the gross planning errors and mismanagement in this war, but such outspokenness should not become policy.

A failure in generalship, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling

His opening sentence is: “For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency.” He goes on to state, “America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy.” He lays out three arguments:

1. generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic possibilities.
2. America’s generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility.
3. remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.

I won’t repeat Col. Yingling’s fairly detailed account of the failings from Vietnam to now. I invite you to read the article. I don’t think anyone would disagree with Item 1. It is a role that has been accepted almost from the beginning of this country. I tend to agree with Item 2 and I need to add that it has taken me most of the 30 plus years since the end of that war to realize that the failure of Vietnam was also partly due to our military leaders.

With 30 plus years between us and the Vietnam War, we can now study it as history. History allows us to evaluate, question, and understand events in ways not possible with current events. The Vietnam War has become our most popular historical event since the Iraq War’s failings became evident. Comparisons abound. For the most part, I agree with Col. Yingling’s assessment of the failure of the generals in that war and their failure to learn from that war. But I would caution drawing much of a lesson from failures to learn from the mistakes of Vietnam.

I doubt that any officer now serving can really grasp the utter desolation of the post-Vietnam military after such a military failure while the American public trashed the uniformed services and all their members as both baby killers and military failures. No one in the military in 1975 wanted to even talk about Vietnam, let alone learn lessons by revisiting those failures. That was true from seaman to admiral, from private to general. And had they learned any lessons, there was no audience. So, yes the generals did fail to learn lessons, but the real causes of why they failed to learn are not replicated today. While our troops today may suffer an unfriendly press and a public that sees only disaster in Iraq, the support for those troops is very high, even if that public is mostly ignorant of the extent of the sacrifices our troops and their families must make.

The Iraq War cannot be studied with the benefit of history. We actually very little about the actual advice given by the generals to the civilian leaders. We (I) strongly suspect that they wimped out when confronted by the driven idealogues Bush and Rumsfeld (and the now discredited neocons), Gen. Shinseki being the noted exception. But we (I) really don’t know for sure. To be specific, I am convinced that Gen. Tommy Franks led a modern version of the Charge of the Light Brigade by leading too few against too many and then acting as a cheerleader for the Administration. But I don’t have facts that say he didn’t warn the President or SecDef.

I (we) don’t have the facts and I doubt Congress has facts – maybe better rumors, but not usually facts. That leads me to Item 3 where Yingling suggests Congress should intervene. Col. Yingling notes, perhaps correctly, that the general officer corps is incapable of changing from within and that outside help is needed. But, if Congress is not in the chain of command and can never actually know all the necessary facts, how can Congress effectively intervene? But let’s look at Col. Yingling’s specific suggestions:

1. Congress must change the system for selecting general officers.
2. Oversight committees must apply increased scrutiny over generating the necessary means and pursuing appropriate ways for applying America’s military power.
3. The Senate must hold accountable through its confirmation powers those officers, who fail to achieve the aims of policy at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure.

Suggestion 1 implies that Congress should inject itself into the general officer selection process. Congress has that power (U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2) but I would hate to see party politics layered on top of military politics. Military politics may be part of the problem, but adding another political layer would only muddy the situation at best, and could destroy a system that does work. Also, our system of government checks and balances often puts Congress in opposition to the Executive. The military chain of command would ultimately suffer if two opposing forces were involved in the selection process.

I agree with Suggestion 2 on oversight but Congress’ lack of oversight during this war is probably more at the heart of our problem than any failing of the general officer corps. Congress failed to exercise oversight on any matters in the Iraq War until very recently when the voters made it painfully clear that Congress was not doing its job. I have faith in the American people to correct a government that is out of control, but the public is a blunt instrument like a sledgehammer whacking a pendulum that won’t return to zero. It doesn’t happen often and the action is not always precise. The pendulum tends to whack the opposite wall and then whack the near wall, only waving at the center as it passes through.

Yingling said something that I think shows his attitude to the military-civilian relationship: “In almost surreal language, professional military men blame their recent lack of candor on the intimidating management style of their civilian masters.” I guess I just don’t consider it all that surreal. I do find it surreal to blame the military subordinates (and the military does value subordination to our civilian leaders) while allowing the senior civilians to be non-professionally intimidating. And, that sentence probably displays my own attitude – I hold our civilian leaders as much responsible for the Iraq debacle (prior to the Surge) as I do any general officer.

Suggestion 3 on inserting Congress into the retirement process is a good idea. The American public and, I think, many non-general officers look at the events at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Graib prisons and the military trials for our troops’ abuses on the streets of Iraq and they never see indictments or convictions of senior officers. Not only are the senior officers responsible for all acts under their command, we also know that none of these events could have taken place without some acceptance or promotion, or at least some knowledge, by those senior officers.

The U.S. military is a society that respects personal honor and there is no honor without accountability. As with the other suggestions, I am not fond of getting Congress involved in the retirement process, but the situation seems to warrant some oversight. I just hope that a Congress that seems to value overpaid and non-accountable corporate executives over decent worker wages would/could determine accountability for military officers.

Challenging the Generals Fred Kaplan

Kaplan zeroes in on the problem of institutional culture and he speaks more directly to the generational gap between junior and senior officers. Kaplan notes that, in a typical year, one quarter to one third of West Point cadets do not re-up after their required five years. This figure ballooned to 44 percent in 2006. Imagine what it must be in September 2007 with the unrelenting tempo of deployments and a President who has so far indicated that there is no end in sight.

Side Note: Recent successes with the Surge seem to be swinging public opinion somewhat in favor of delaying troop withdrawals. So swings the public, so swings Congress. Assume we continue the Surge for a few months longer (I think we should) and that the Iraqi government or its people make some political progress. I doubt this would improve officer, or any, retention because the exodus of service members is tied more to the op tempo than to battlefield conditions. In fact, I would guess that delaying those needed rotations will only cause more service members to leave, thereby further degrading our defense posture.

Kaplan also notes that the gap is not only one of attitude but one of trust. Most senior officers rose in what was mostly a period of peace. Today’s junior officers have much more battle experience and many feel their senior officers have let them down, especially with regards to the op tempo. (One might note that apparently the JCS is now opposing this tempo because of its affect on morale and our lack of defense readiness for anything other than Iraq.) While I and others have been touting the value of the new Army/Marines counterinsurgency operations (FM 3-24), Kaplan points out that 70 percent of training at the Captains Career Course remains in conventional warfare. Kaplan also reports the rough handling Yingling received from his division commander after he first published his article and he discusses the odd non-promotion of Col. H.R. McMaster who successfully employed counterinsurgency techniques in Iraq but also published a book dealing with the failure of the general officers in Vietnam.

The general officer corps is stuck in the mud but is that new or is it news? Because the military is so institutionalized and has always been, a general officer corps that is slow to change seems to go with the territory. And it seems to be at its worst when a peacetime Army goes to war. Much of the senior officer corps was canned before we entered WWI. Gen. Marshall removed many officers and replaced them with junior officers during the early years of WWII. But the problem seems different and probably worse today. Given that our future wars will most likely be insurgent wars and that our generals are not responding quickly enough, the situation might very well be worse. Also allowing our military to be committed to one questionable war in Iraq at the expense of our total national defense seems unforgivable.

I know a little about innovation. As an officer I had a reputation as a maverick, perhaps due to my eight years enlisted service which gave me a sense of what I could get away with. I had also learned that getting the job done often meant bypassing regulations or the “normal” channels. Throughout my career I was deep selected at each promotion (if that’s not an Army term, in the Navy it meant promotion ahead of contemporaries). I received many awards and commendations including the Navy’s highest non-combat medal. I often disagreed with my superiors but never did I even consider going public on that matter. Going public with your disagreements seems to be the gist of these two articles and I am still not convinced that is a good idea, even if it now seems to be the only answer to a stick-in-the-mud senior officer corps.

Kaplan brings up a very good point that today’s military needs innovation and that general officers like to select people for promotion who are much like themselves. And ‘themselves’ are people who have spent 25 years conforming to the institution.

Apparently I was being groomed for admiral at the time I retired. I was told so when I put in my retirement papers but I attributed that to just an attempt to keep me from retiring. After retirement, I talked to some on the selection board and a couple of my admiral bosses and they verified that it was true. Before you think I am boasting, remember that this was 1975 and just about anyone who decided to stay in the service was guaranteed promotions, if not necessarily to the top. However, I knew at that time that I was not admiral material. Partly I was fed up with fighting the system but mostly I knew that I was not political enough to make the grade. My points here are that innovation can work in the military, and that the conflict between junior and senior officers is not new.

I would propose that the Army and the other services can promote innovators by action from within and that it won’t take 25 years. Earlier I referred to the canning of officers in WWI and WWII. I remember a quote (don’t remember the source) of one senior commander in WWII France to the effect that it was a good thing that we took on Germany in North Africa before attempting the invasion of Europe, otherwise it would have ended in disaster. The point was that we learned a lot through the many mistakes made by Britain and the U.S. in North Africa but that we improved greatly in less than three years. An untold part of that success might include the canning of officers who were unfit to command.

Let’s not forget that quite a few of the officers who are now conducting successful counterinsurgency are lieutenant colonels and full bird colonels and that they are not far from promotion to general. Let us not forget that Gen. Petraeus who commands the Iraq operations is of the same innovative fabric as these junior officers and he is a leader. The same is true of Gen. Odierno and, I suspect, of many other officers under Petraeus’ command. During and after Vietnam, there was no audience for lessons learned. Now we have a SecDef and a President who apparently have listened to lessons learned as evidenced by a remarkable change of tactics, strategy, and battlefield commanders in the middle of the crisis.

I have watched generations come from the self-infatuated hippy generation to the current generation. From my aged perspective and in terms of interest in public service, the hippy generation was a low point and each succeeding generation has seen some increased desire to commit to something greater than one’s self. Those men and women currently serving in enlisted ranks and as junior officers exhibit that desire to a level I’ve not seen in my lifetime. I honestly believe that these folks are the ones who will eventually improve the general officer corps, both by pressuring for change now and by making those changes happen when they enter that corps.

I don’t want to end this post by leaving the impression that the military is closed to public display of internal disagreements. In fact the military is far more open to disagreements than most corporations and the rest of federal government. Publications such as the Armed Forces Journal attest to that fact, but I admit that McMaster and Yingling are mostly alone in directly attacking general officers as a group. They do have something important to say and let us hope that their promotions will depend more on their performance