15 April 2008

Maliki, "There ain't room enough in this town for al Sadr and me."

In my last post I closed with, "I've thought some about the recent Maliki moves against Basra militias. I'm not sure what all this means."

I'm still not sure what all this fighting in Basra and now Sadr City means but some reporters who are close to the action have some useful info and some plausible ideas.

The Quiet Time

Let me back up a little to some concerns I had last year. I was impressed by the Surge but I also wondered how much of the reduction in violence was also due to other factors. One important factor was Muqtada al-Sadr's truce. No one ever doubted that he and his Mahdi Army still wanted to drive the American occupiers out: they just decided not to shoot at the time, probably realizing that they weren't quite ready to take on the US forces. But little press was given to the extent of the rivalry between Maliki and al-Sadr.

Now fast forward a few months. Al Qaeda has been reduced to a dangerous annoyance. The Sunnis are happy with America as long as we give them arms and money, and let them "form a government from the bottom up." The central government is still dominated by Shias, with a little Kurd help. al-Sadr's truce has kept things relatively quiet in the predominantly Shia areas from Sadr City south through Basra to the Gulf. Fighting in and around Basra has been intense and the Brits basically abandoned the city, but that fighting is mostly between factions who would like to control oil fields (60% of Iraqi oil).

Maliki Government Moves on Mahdi Army

In late March, the Iraqi Army moved on Basra. Malcom Nance at the Small Wars Journal has an interesting post, "The Basrah Gambit – Defining Moment for Iraq or the Jaysh al-Mahdi?" Malcom reminds us of the misinformation put out by MNF and Iraqi press reps. The Iraqi Army's push to Basra would appear to be an effort to control various dissidents, but local Mahdi militia elements see this as a direct attack only against them. Malcom agrees.

Malcom very clearly tells us just why the operations in Basra were the opening salvos of this new Maliki versus al-Sadr rivalry. The Basra operation began on 25 March and by the time of Malcom's post (31 March), the Iraqi Army had not actually entered Basra when another cease fire was declared. It looks like a defeat for the Iraqi Army since they had overwhelming numbers but couldn't penetrate Mahdi strongholds. The Mahdis apparently had a lot of casualties but the Iraqi Army had some 1300 defectors. The media-press made sure we knew about the defectors as an indicator of the Iraqi Army's incompetence. I'm not so sure. I don't think the number is that large and I would suspect many of those were troubled by this being a brother-against-brother kind of battle. Since this was also the first test of the new army, it would also be a good time to get rid of deadwood. What's not generally reported is that the Iraqi Army took control of several other southern cities. Still, al-Sadr came out looking like the political winner.

The Pentagon to put another spin on the Basra action by claiming the southern citizens were fed up with all the violence and that the Iraqi Army was going to help them out. The Pentagon said, "I think at this early stage, it looks as though it is a by-product of the success of the surge." The Surge was never anywhere near Basra. Those citizens on the receiving end of the Iraqi Army see this as simply the Maliki Army against the al-Sadr militia.

Nance also informs us of how our forces have been destroying some Mahdi Army units by claiming that they were rogue elements (Anti-Iraqi Forces) who were not following the truce. This allowed the US to whittle away at al-Sadr's militia without breaking the truce. That action may be a prelude to the action that's moved back to Baghdad - specifically Sadr City.

Badr Brigade, Iran Proxy

I rarely see the media-press refer to the Badr Brigade but they are a major player. The Badr Brigade was formed in opposition to Saddam Hussein. They formed into a viable military force (of perhaps 10,000 strong) during the Iran-Iraq War. They were based in Iran and didn't return to Iraq until we toppled Saddam. The Brigade has participated fully in the Iraqi government and the elections, and they are closely allied with Maliki. Both the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army accept help from Iran, but this probably tells us less about support for Iran than it tells us that Iran has much better Islamic diplomatic skills than the US.

Badr Brigade members make up a significant part of the Iraqi Army and the national police. They have been implicated in atrocities against both Sunnis and Shias. They have certainly committed acts against followers of al-Sadr. See Joe Klein's article, "Too Many Kagans, Too Little Knowledge" at Swampland for more info on how our government perpetuates myths about the warring factions in Iraq.

Can't Take Basra? Try Sadr City

Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal has two articles of perspective on Sadr City. In "Ayatollah Sistani on the Mahdi Army" Bill reports on the Grand Ayatollah Sistani's support of the central government and his call for the Mahdi Army to disband. Also important is that Bill connects this push to isolate al Sadr with the recent Basra actions. Noteworthy is that al Sadr's supporters in the Iraqi Parliament are also being isolated.

In a later article, "Iraqi government: "We will continue until we secure Sadr City"," Roggio describes the extent of the operation in and around Sadr City. He reports that there are nine MNF brigades, 3 Iraqi Army and one National Police brigades in the area. MNF force is close to half our total Iraq force. Stryker units, usually the advance strike units, are already engaged with Mahdi units as are air support and Predator units.

Why Now?

With all this action occurring suspiciously just before Gen. Petraeus' testimony and during the presidential campaign, rumors on timing are everywhere. Malcom Nance (see above Nance article) lists a few which I'll just summarize (note that Nance's article is of 31 March):

  1. Success in Basra would give General Petraeus yet another opportunity to claim before Congress that he needs an additional six months.
  2. Could also play well for Senator John McCain's pro-Iraqi War stance.
  3. May have also been an attempt at a Hail Mary pass originating from the White House and carried to Iraq in Cheney's recent visit. The purpose could have been to benefit the Republican cause and to salvage Bush's legacy.

Since the Iraqi Army did little in Basra, none of the above possible benefits became real. However I believe, again if any of the above are true, the push against Sadr City is even more important to the Administration and Gen. Petraeus (and Maliki). An interesting side note on Item 2 above is that McCain might have telegraphed the Basra operation before it happened. On his return to the US, McCain said, “Today America and its allies, stand on the precipice of winning a major victory against radical Islamic extremism.” Could be. Or maybe McCain prefers precipices to turning corners.

My Note

It's easy to read evil intent in the orchestrated press briefings by this most secretive, shadow Bush Administration. It's also easy to make light of any show of progress since most Bush progress claims have devolved into mini-Mission-Accomplished charades. But none of the reporters I've referenced in this post have noted that, in addition to Basra and Sadr City being the first major action of their new army, it is also the first major political action taken taken by the Iraqi government. Am I reading too much into this?

Yes, there warring factions and even personal vendettas involved. But the US has demanded a political solution. For that to happen, someone has to win. We hope that all parties can win but that is not likely. Our best bet is to help the Maliki government root out those who oppose a workable central government. Finally we may be seeing some political movement from the Iraqi government.

Once the Mahdi Army is defeated, then they might take on the more important smaller factions. The remaining question is, Can the Iraqi Army (with MNF's help) prevail against the Mahdi?

2 comments:

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