Sometimes Right, Sometimes Wrong

I reviewed my initial posts which began in June 07 and ended November 07. My original intent back in June was to introduce counterinsurgency operations (COIN) theory, and the Army Marines field manual FM 3-24, to non-military readers. When I quit posting, I was averaging around 70 readers a day, each staying an average of about 4 to 7 minutes. I even had a handful of subscribers, but I had absolutely no comments (one tiny exception). Two veteran bloggers told me there is a critical mass of 500 or more readers before folks start to comment - has something to do with no one wanting to be the first to comment, I guess. But it sure was hard to continue with no feedback.

I stopped in November because of a couple of health problems but I did not resume when the health issues quickly ended. I discovered that I had little more to say on COIN or FM 3-24. Not much had changed in those six months of posting.

I've reviewed those posting I was wrong in some instances.

• I supported the administration in taking a belligerent tone toward Iran. I believed that scaring them was our only option. I now think that was irrational.
• I favored a soft partition of Iraq. That was not so wrong as it has become impossible to even consider it as a U.S. policy position. Instead I think we are facing some kind of partition through internal civil wars. Whether soft or hard partition, or a return to another brutal dictatorship may depend on the outcomes of several civil wars within Iraq.

My main objection to COIN operations was in FM 3-24's troop estimates. We were, and still are, far short of those requirements in Iraq and even further short of the requirements for just about any other country where we might have to conduct COIN.

I tried to come up with some metrics to measure the success of COIN operations and the Surge. I don't think I was very successful. But I did note that violence levels on civilians had not been reduced as much as the press had trumpeted. Late in 2007, I said that violence in Baghdad had been reduced to mid-2006 levels and that elsewhere in Iraq the violence was about the same. Sadly, that too has not changed much. Now entering our sixth year of war, we can only claim we've reduced violence to a level of about two years ago. In the meantime we've created or allowed Baghdad to become more ghettoized and we've made no inroads into the Shiite militias. The relative peace in Baghdad may be only a prelude to inter-ghetto conflicts as the U.S. reduces troop levels.

I expressed concern that Iraq was dangerously stressing our troops, both regular and reserve component. That concern is now surfacing as a major campaign issue, but I doubt that most Americans realize just how vulnerable we are. We are certainly less safe than on the eve of the Iraqi invasion. The recent tour reductions from 15 to 12 months will only prevent the Iraq/Afghanistan stress from increasing (and that won't be effective for another year), but it will takes years to reform, supply, and train units.

The Surge and our COIN operations have one overarching goal and that is to get the Iraqi government to agree on its form and to take control of the country. FM 3-24 notes that the ultimate goal is a political solution and Gen. Petraeus also tout a political solution.

Is there any progress toward a central government? We really don't know since no press reports from anyone tell us anything of importance about what's going on inside the Iraqi government. We know they have real problems coming together and the process is difficult. We know most of their important issues. Yet we know of no progress on any issue. Given that the Bush Administration touts every success, even when there isn't one, and that they've touted no successes or progress in this case, I assume there is no progress. With no political progress and no other tools than our military, why are we still there? I don't know.

Throughout all those posts I've asked people to support our troops through donations, and by giving attention to the real sacrifices of our troops and their families and loved ones. I think, more than anything else, I wanted Americans to be engaged in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. My favorite quote in all my post was from Victor Hanson at the National Review,

"...a society that does not fathom who keeps them safe in order that it might stare at Oprah and fixate on Brad and Angelina, eventually will be a society not kept safe to so stare or fixate."

Since not much has changed in the Iraq War, I hope to move on to other subjects, but I will frequently revisit Iraq since I can't get it out of my mind.

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I wrote the above post a couple of days ago. Since then, I've thought some about the recent Maliki moves against Basra militias. I'm not sure what all this means and the press is giving us only shallow coverage, but I think this is really an important event. The Maliki army conducted its first major operation and failed. Al Sadr called a truce and came out an obvious winner, but the Iraqi Parliament is still trying to bar legislators who have militia ties from being seated. The U.S. supported the Iraqi army operations, but Gen. Petraeus indicated that we didn't agree with the operation in the first place. The White House says things are going well in Iraq, but may have to admit that giving Basra to the Brits, who also left, was a mistake.

So many "buts." The Basra region contains sixty percent of Iraq's oil and has the only accesss to the sea. Basra militias are more than the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade. Think of many warlord wannabees jockeying for control of oil fields regardless of whither the Iraqi government goes.